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Abstract 
 
A merger requires at least one of two separate yet equally important sets of 
negotiations. The first involves merging parties to discuss issues related to the terms of 
the merger, including target firm’s valuation. The second resolves disputes between the 
merging parties and the government regulatory agency over the potential anticompetitive 
impact of the merger. In the first essay, I investigate the probability of completing an 
acquisition deal conditional on the government approval by applying a nested logit 
model. My results support the findings of Eckbo (1985), Coate, Higgins, and McChesney 
(1990), and Coate (2005) that mergers that are expected to increase market concentration 
are more likely to be challenged by the government. Consistent with Officer (2003) and 
Bates and Lemmon (2003), I find that including target termination fees is significantly 
positively related to the probability of completion irrespective of whether the deal is 
challenged or not. However, I document that including target termination fees deters 
competitive bidding only if the deal was challenged and leads to higher bid premium to 
the target firm only if the deal was not challenged. Conditional on not being challenged, 
acquirer’s investment opportunities and the relative size of acquirer and target firms are 
significantly positively related to the probability of completion, while target investment 
opportunities and the existence of multiple bidders are significantly negatively related to 
the probability of completion. Conditional on the merger being challenged, acquirer’s 
investment opportunities and the existence of target termination fees are positively 
related to the probability of completion and only the existence of multiple bidders is 
 vii
negatively related to the probability of completion. In the second essay, I study the 
impact of asset sales on the firm’s focus level, information asymmetry, and operating 
performance. I find that following a merger facilitating asset sale the firm becomes more 
diversified, its information asymmetry increases, and its operating performance does not 
change while following a non merger related asset sale, the firm becomes more focused, 
its information asymmetry decreases, and its operating performance improves 
significantly.  
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Essay I 
To Merge or Not To Merge: Factors Affecting the Successful Completion of 
a Merger 
 
1. Introduction:  
A merger or acquisition1 represents one of the most important strategic decisions 
made by managers as well as shareholders of the engaged firms. Any merger or 
acquisition deal involves at least one of two separate yet equally important sets of 
negotiations. The first set puts the managers and/or the shareholders of the acquiring and 
target firms face to face to discuss issues related to the terms of the merger, including 
target firm’s valuation, while the second set resolves disputes between the merging 
parties and the government regulatory agency over the potential anticompetitive impact 
of the merger.2 A breakdown in either set of negotiations would render the merger 
attempt unsuccessful and, therefore, an announcement of merger does not necessarily 
mean it will eventually be completed.   
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this dissertation the terms “merger”, “acquisition”, and “takeover” are used 
interchangeably.  
2 Section 7 of Clayton Act of 1914 in conjunction with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
of 1976 (henceforth, HSR Act) governs merger and acquisition activity. Section 7 of Clayton Act prohibits 
firms from acquiring, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock, assets, or share capital of 
another firm when the effect of such acquisition may substantially lessen competition, or create a 
monopoly. The HSR Act, which became effective in August 30, 1978, requires firms to file notification 
with the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General and wait a designated period of 
time before consummating the acquisition if the deal meets or exceeds the jurisdictional thresholds 
mandated in the Act2. The federal government, through its different agencies, challenges merger or 
acquisition proposals that violate section 7 of Clayton Act and requires the merger parties to pursue a 
remedial action as a condition for approving the merger. The remedial action takes many forms that include 
requiring merger parties to divest some of acquirer’s or target’s assets to a buyer approved by the 
regulatory agency or limiting acquiring firm’s (or combined firm’s) future attempts at external expansion 
(e.g. forming business combinations or giving up patents).    
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Early theoretical and empirical research on the success of merger attempt 
(Walkling, 1985; Samuelson and Rosenthal, 1986; Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990) finds 
that the bid premium, the acquirer’s ownership of the target prior to the actual acquisition 
offer (i.e., acquirer’s toehold), and target managements’ opposition are important factors 
in predicting the acquisition deal outcome. More recent research (Officer, 2003; Bates 
and Lemmon, 2003; Hotchkiss, Qian, and Song, 2005) focuses basically on the role of 
bidder and target termination fees in acquisition deal completion. The evidence is that 
termination fees serve as an efficient contracting device in the sense that they mitigate 
information asymmetries between the merger parties, rather than their being an attempt 
by target managers to deter competitive bidding.  
Although the previous literature presents useful analyses of how a merger 
completion decision is made, the regulatory role in a merger completion process has 
escaped researchers’ attention. Thus, several interesting questions relevant to this issue 
remain unanswered. These questions include the following:  
1- What role, if any, do merger regulations and antitrust requirements play in 
a firm’s decision to complete an acquisition deal? 
2- What role do other factors play in a firm’s decision to successfully 
complete an acquisition deal, conditioned upon regulatory approval or 
disapproval? Specifically, there are two opposite issues that beg to be 
addressed in this respect: a) what factors will motivate merging parties to 
complete the merger in spite of a regulatory challenge? b) what factors 
will motivate the parties to cancel the merger even in the absence of a 
regulatory challenge? and  
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3- What, if any, is the actual cost of a merger facilitating divestiture? How 
does it affect the acquirer’s future growth needs and internal capital 
allocation efficiency? 
These questions are intriguing in light of the evidence that the impact of 
government intervention is not uniform across firms seeking mergers. At first glance, it 
appears that government intervention has a deterring impact on acquisitions proposed by 
some firms but not on those proposed by other firms. Similarly, the cost of compliance 
with regulatory requirements appears to be different across merger-seeking firms. For 
example, Barnes & Noble Inc. withdrew its proposal to buy Ingram Book Group, a 
closely held unit of Ingram Industries Inc., following the Federal Trade Commission’s 
opposition although both companies believed that the merger would be ultimately 
approved, while Albertson’s Inc. chose to complete its merger with American Stores Co. 
although it was required to divest more stores than it had expected.3 These two examples 
pose two opposite rationales: Barnes & Noble case implies that if the merger had gone 
through, the government requirements would have made it ex-ante infeasible, while 
Albertson’s case implies that even after divesting some assets, the merger was still ex-
ante feasible. Thus, the bases on which these firms made their deal completion or 
cancellation decision seem to be different and the assets that these firms are required to 
divest seem to have different impact on their future growth needs.4       
                                                 
3 For more details about these two cases, refer to the Wall Street Journal editions on June 3, 1999 and June 
22, 1999. 
4 For more details about the antitrust remedies, refer to the following website: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.htm 
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In this first essay, I investigate the first two issues raised above.5 More 
specifically, I study the factors that explain the decision to cancel or complete a merger 
deal, conditioned on the regulatory approval.  
 
2. Literature Review:  
 The literature pertaining to mergers and acquisitions is abundant. Below I provide 
a brief summary of the research that is immediately relevant to the question I address in 
this essay. This provides a perspective on where my research contributes to the literature, 
while it also motivates my analysis.    
  
2.1. Motives behind Mergers and Acquisitions:  
 Since 1980, the U.S corporate market has been witnessing huge restructuring 
activities that culminated in the largest merger wave in the U.S history in the 1990s. Most 
of the acquisitions of the 1980s were hostile, paid for with cash, and played a significant 
role in disciplining managers, while most of those of the 1990s were friendly, paid for 
with stock, and played a trivial role as a corporate governance mechanism (Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Kini, Kracaw, and Mian, 2004). During 1998-2001 many 
mergers have also been most value destroying (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005). 
Extant literature has thoroughly investigated the announcement effect of mergers 
and acquisitions. An overwhelming conclusion of this line of research can be summarized 
as follows: the targets return is positive and statistically significant, while for the acquirer 
                                                 
5 In the second essay, I investigate the third issue posed above. Specifically, I follow those merger cases 
where the acquirer was required to actually divest some assets or an entire division as a prerequisite for the 
merger approval. I compare merger facilitating asset divestitures and non-merger related asset divestitures 
in the context of acquirer’s future growth needs and internal capital allocation efficiency.  
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it is insignificant.6 Travlos (1987) notes that the announcement return to the acquirer is 
affected by the method of payment (i.e., positive reaction to cash mergers and negative 
reaction to stock exchange offers), and argues that the negative reaction for stock offers is 
consistent with signaling hypothesis implying that stock offers convey information that 
the bidding firm is overvalued. Brown and Ryngaert (1991) present empirical evidence 
consistent with this argument and further argue that bidders offer stock in order to avoid 
the tax consequences of cash offers. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) also present an 
asymmetric information model that implies that in takeovers financed with mixture of 
cash and equity, the higher the amount of cash, the higher the abnormal returns to 
stockholders of both the acquirer and target. Huang and Walkling (1987) present 
empirical evidence consistent with this implication.       
The literature provides both theoretical and empirical explanations as to why 
firms engage in mergers and acquisitions. The first explanation suggested in the literature 
is the market (or the monopolistic) power hypothesis. It is argued that a takeover may be 
driven by the acquiring firm’s desire to gain larger market share by acquiring rival firms 
so that it could control output prices. However, such clear motivation is scrutinized and 
prohibited by the federal government for its potential anticompetitive impact. Ellert 
(1976) presents finds that enforcement of antimerger law does not dislodge monopolistic 
concentration of corporate wealth. Eckbo (983); Stillman (1983); and Trembplay and 
Trembplay (1988), test the effectiveness of this policy and find little or no evidence of 
anticompetitive effects for firms prosecuted by the FTC. Most recently, Fee and Thomas 
                                                 
6 See for example, Huang, and Walkling (1987), Bradely, Desai, and Kim (1988), Servaes (1991), and most 
recently Luo (2005), among others. 
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(2004) and Sharur (2005) find that horizontal mergers (i.e. mergers between competitors) 
challenged by the FTC, are primarily motivated by efficiency considerations. 
The hubris hypothesis, coined by Roll (1986) is another explanation for takeovers. 
It asserts that the decision makers of the acquiring firm suffer from hubris, so they 
mistakenly believe that the target firm value is above its market price and consequently 
overpay. Roll (1986) argues that the hubris hypothesis assumes that markets are strong-
form efficient but may imply that the market for corporate control is inefficient. 
Therefore, hubris alone cannot explain the takeover phenomenon. Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) test the hubris hypothesis and document that they cannot reject it in 
spite of their finding that the primary motive behind takeovers is the synergetic gains.        
Given the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, an acquisition 
may be one way by which managers spend firm’s resources on nonpositive or even 
negative net present value projects. However, if the market for corporate control is 
efficient, such a firm will become a takeover target rather than being an acquiring firm. 
As a result, a takeover is both an evidence of conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders and a solution of the problem. This is the free cash flow theory of takeovers 
formalized in Jensen (1986). It predicts that managers of firms with unused borrowing 
power and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake value-destroying mergers. 
Furthermore, these mergers are more likely to be diversifying mergers. Harford (1999) 
provides empirical evidence supportive of the Free Cash Flow theory. He finds that cash-
rich firms are more likely to make diversifying, value destroying acquisitions. The 
prediction that diversification does destroy value has been empirically supported by 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) show that firms that undertake 
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diversifying mergers are poor performers. More recently, Aggrawal and Samwick (2003) 
provide theoretical and empirical evidence that, in equilibrium, firms in which managers 
experience an increase in private benefits of diversification will diversify more. 
Matsusaka (1996) finds that diversification is not driven by tough antitrust enforcement 
that may have prevented firms from growing in their industries, and that smaller firms are 
as likely to diversify as larger ones.      
  More recent explanations for mergers include market misvaluation and the 
industry shocks. Theoretical models of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf 
and Vishwanathan (2003) predict that merger waves occur as managers time acquisitions 
when the market overvalues their firms. Empirically, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2003) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2005) find evidence 
supportive of this prediction. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show that merger waves are 
the result of firms’ adaptation to industry shocks. However, whether an economic, 
regulatory, or technological shock leads to a merger wave depends on whether there is 
sufficient liquidity in capital markets (Harford, 2004).    
  
2.2. The success of a merger or acquisition attempt: 
The interest in modeling a takeover outcome has been propelled by the 
observation of asymmetric reactions to news of bid success and bid failure. Dodd (1980) 
shows that merger success announcement is greeted by positive market reaction while 
merger cancellation announcement is perceived as bad news. This may imply that 
information pertaining to the outcome of takeover was not fully incorporated in the stock 
price at the initial announcement of the takeover. Alternatively, the asymmetric stock 
 8
price reaction to merger failure and success can be explained by new information 
released by the acquiring and/or target firms during the time between the initial 
announcement date of a merger and its eventual outcome date. A merger is a lengthy 
process that may take more than one year to be concluded (completed or canceled). 
Research shows that, on average, the length of time between the announcement date and 
completion or termination date is six months.7 During this time period new information 
might be released about the acquirer and target firms, consequently changing 
shareholders’ estimates about the post-merger value of the combined firm and possibly 
the likelihood of completing the merger deal. Consistent with this latter implication, 
Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986) find that target stock price changes can predict the deal 
outcome and Luo (2005) finds that merging companies use information extracted from 
market reaction in closing a merger deal. However, Jennings and Mazzeo (1991) find that 
managers do not learn from changes in their stock prices when completing or canceling 
their acquisition deal. Additionally, the new information allows competitors reevaluate 
the initial bidder’s assessment of the target value, influencing their decision as to whether 
or not they should make competitive bids. Walkling (1985) finds that the existence of a 
competing bid and target management resistance decrease probability of takeover success 
while increased bid premium and payment of solicitation fees increase it. Hirshleifer and 
Titman (1990) provide theoretical perspective that supports these results.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See for example, Hotchkiss, Qian, and Song (2005) and Boone and Mulherin (2004).  
 9
2.3. Cost of a failed merger attempt: 
The failure of a merger attempt can entail significant direct and indirect costs to 
the acquirer, target, or both firms.8 From the time of a merger announcement to the time 
when it is completed or canceled, the acquiring firm discloses information that it would 
not otherwise disclose, incurs substantial legal expenses, and faces production activity 
disruptions as well as management distraction.9 If the deal falls through, then competitors 
are in a better position to use such information to their advantage. Ekbo and Wier (1985) 
find evidence that rival firms benefit from the news of a merger proposal and that a delay 
in completion of the deal gives rival firms additional time to exploit the news. Bates and 
Lemmon (2003) find that the inclusion of target termination fees is more frequent in 
merger deals where the potential for information expropriation by third parties is 
significant. The target, on the other hand, has to seek other means of restructuring, 
including being taken over by a different firm,10 which may not be possible within a short 
period of time. The literature overwhelmingly suggests that the target firm’s stock price 
reacts favorably at the acquisition announcement date, with the average abnormal return 
exceeding 10%.11 However, Wier (1983) finds that between the merger announcement 
date and the date when the deal is canceled following antitrust challenge, targets lose all 
                                                 
8 An example of the direct cost of failed acquisition attempt is Staples and Office Depot merger attempt. 
Staples invested more than $ 20 million in the case before the merger was banned by the government.  
9 For example, when announcing the termination of Viasoft’s acquisition agreement with Compuware, 
Steven Whiteman, Viasoft chairman, said “The board of directors did not believe that continuing litigation, 
with its inherent risks, substantial costs and potential irreparable damage to our business and relationships 
with customers, distributors, and employees, was in the best interest of Viasoft shareholders.   
10 Getting eventually taken over seems to be the best strategy for most of the unsuccessful targets. For 
example, Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) find that targets of unsuccessful takeover that had resisted an initial 
offer are less likely to stay independent six months after the outcome date than are targets of unsuccessful 
takeover that did not resist. 
11 See for example Luo (2005), among others.   
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the announcement period gains.12 She interprets this result as the cost of antitrust lawsuit 
to acquisition targets. Moreover, the party that reneges on a merger deal bears the risk of 
having to compensate the other party for damages stemming from the abandoned deal.13  
 
3. Hypotheses Development:  
 Based on the empirical evidence presented earlier, it seems that the likelihood of 
success or failure of a merger depends on whether or not the regulatory agencies 
challenge the deal. Thus, the determinants of completion or cancellation decision may be 
different when it is conditioned on the regulatory approval. I, therefore, visualize the 
merger completion or cancellation decision as in figure I where the merger parties get to 
choose between completing and canceling the deal after they observe the government 
decision as to whether or not the deal is challenged. I develop two sets of hypotheses that 
capture intricacies of the merger process path. The first set of the hypotheses is in regard 
to the regulatory agency’s  decision to challenge (or not challenge) the acquisition deal, 
while the second set concerns merger parties’ decision to complete (or cancel) the 
acquisition conditional on the regulatory agency’s approval.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Also, Dodd (1980) finds that when the merger is canceled because it had been vetoed by incumbent 
target management, target firms retain some of the value gains they had realized when the merger was 
announced while when the merger is canceled for other reasons, target stock price falls back to where it 
was before the merger announcement.     
13 For example, Northeast Utilities filed lawsuit against Consolidated Edison Inc for more than $1 billion 
for the latter’s withdrawal from the planned merger. 
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Figure I: The path of a merger or acquisition proposal 
 
  Merger or acquisition proposal 
 
 
 
          Challenged                        Not Challenged  
 
 
            Completed           Cancelled        Completed         Cancelled 
 
 
 3.1. Factors Influencing Regulatory Challenge: 
 3.1.1. Market Concentration: 
 The regulatory investigation process of a merger begins once the merger parties 
accurately complete the forms required for notifying the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ). The HSR Act requires both the acquiring and 
the acquired entities to file notification if all the following conditions are met: (a) one 
entity has sales or assets of at least $100 million; (b) the other entity has sales or assets of 
at least $10 million; and (c) as a result of the transaction, the acquiring entity will hold an 
aggregate amount of stock and assets of the acquired entity valued at more than $50 
million; or (d) as a result of the transaction, the acquiring entity will hold an aggregate 
amount of stock and assets of the acquired entity valued at more than $200 million, 
regardless of the sales or assets of the acquiring  and acquired entity. The parties must 
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then wait a specified period, usually 30 days (15 days in the case of a cash tender or a 
bankruptcy sale), before they may complete the transaction.14  
 The DOJ issued its merger guidelines in 1984 in order to describe the general 
principles and specific standards normally used by the department in analyzing mergers 
to decide whether or not they violate Section 7 of Clayton Act. These guidelines are also 
among other undisclosed criteria that the FTC uses in its antitrust investigations. Coate, 
Higgins, and McChesney (1990) find that the FTC’s decision to file an antitrust 
complaint against particular acquisitions is determined by these guidelines beside 
political factors. In 1992 the DOJ and FTC jointly issued horizontal merger guidelines to 
clarify certain aspects that proved to be ambiguous in the previous guidelines. Merger-
induced increase in market concentration is the primary basis for the DOJ and the FTC in 
deciding whether or not to challenge a merger or acquisition. Since horizontal mergers 
(mergers between competitors) have the greatest potential for increasing market 
concentration, these proposals are primary targets for regulatory challenges. Additionally, 
vertical mergers (merger between producer and customer) that have the potential to 
increase concentration (measured by the Herfindahl Hirshman Index) in the market in 
which the merger parties operate trigger regulatory scrutiny.15  
 Eckbo (1985) models the government’s decision to successfully challenge a 
proposed merger deal and finds that merger-induced increase in market concentration 
                                                 
14 For some cases, the FTC or the DOJ may need more time for investigation and therefore it issues a 
“second request” that requires the parties to provide additional documents and wait for another 30 days (10 
days in the case of a cash tender or bankruptcy sale). If the first waiting period expires without issuing the 
“second request” then the parties can complete the transaction. 
15 The FTC and DOJ merger guidelines define a market as a product or group of products and a geographic 
area in which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price 
regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of those products in that area likely 
would impose at least a “small but significant and nontransitory” increase in price, assuming the terms of 
sale of all other products are held constant. 
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increases the probability of challenging a merger while the number of rival firms 
decreases it. Coate et al (1990) model the FTC’s decision to challenge merger proposals 
and examine a sample of cases for which the FTC issued a second request between 1982 
and 1987. They find that increase in HHI, the existence of barriers to entry, and the 
possibility of collusion as a result of the merger can significantly predict the FTC’s 
decision to challenge a merger deal. Coate (2005) finds that the probability that the FTC 
would file a complaint against a proposed merger increases with the post-merger HHI 
and the number of consumer complaints. The importance of the market share and 
concentration as determinants of challenging merger proposals is not limited to the 
U.S.A. Governments of many other countries use them as a basis on which 
anticompetitive impacts of mergers are determined.16  
Based on the procedures and decision rules that the government follows in 
analyzing and challenging mergers and the evidence presented by Eckbo (1985), Coate et 
al (1990) and Coate (2005) I hypothesize that  
 
 H1: The greater the expected increase in the HHI in the relevant industry, the greater is 
the chance that the merger proposal will be challenged.  
   
The strategic importance to the economy of the industry in which a merger is 
attempted may determine how severely the merger is scrutinized by the government. 
Also, if the major player in the market is a foreign firm, the government may more likely 
allow the merger to go through. Therefore, when testing the above hypothesis, I control 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Khemani and Shapiro (1993). 
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for the industry in which the merger is attempted and for the market share held by foreign 
firm (s). 
3.2. Factors affecting merger Completion Decision conditioned on the                   
Regulatory Decision: 
 3.2.1. Target Termination Fees: 
The literature presents two opposing arguments in explaining the role of the target 
termination fees in merger or acquisition deals: The managerial entrenchment hypothesis 
and the efficiency hypothesis. The managerial entrenchment hypothesis asserts that 
incumbent target management agrees to pay termination fees in order to lock their firms 
with bidders that promise them job security should the deal be completed. The efficiency 
hypothesis argues that termination fees reflect target managers’ attempts to increase their 
shareholders’ wealth. It asserts that target firm managers offer termination fees to the 
bidder in order to encourage it to reveal information about its post-merger plans for target 
assets that the bidder may be reluctant to disclose in order to prevent competitors from 
free riding on this information.17 Such information would enhance target manager’s 
bargaining power to ask for higher premium, which will eventually benefit target 
shareholders. Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that target termination 
fees are associated with higher bid premiums and higher probability of deal success, a 
result that supports the efficiency hypothesis.  
In merger deals that are challenged by the government, there are, at least, two 
reasons to believe that the target firm’s agreement to pay termination fees is unlikely to 
serve as an incentive for the acquirer to reveal private information. First, challenged 
                                                 
17 Competitors’ ability to exploit the information revealed during merger proposals is empirically supported 
by Eckbo and Wier (1985). 
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mergers are mergers in the same industry or related industries and, therefore, both the 
acquirer and the target firms have less information asymmetries about each other’s values 
as well as about how each others assets can be used. Second, in challenged mergers the 
HSR Act prohibits the acquirer and the target from sharing information about each 
other’s operations, pricing mechanisms, or future plans until the government agency 
concludes the investigation process lasting well beyond 30 days. This suggests that 
termination fees in challenged mergers are more likely to be used to deter competition 
rather than as a means to encourage the bidder to disclose information about the target’s 
value. 
Another reason for including target termination fees in merger deals is presented 
by Hotchkiss et al (2005). They model the contracting and negotiation process in mergers 
allowing for new information arrival subsequent to the signing of an initial merger 
agreement. The model implies that including target termination fees in a merger contract 
increases the expected merger synergy if the deal is completed by giving the acquirer the 
incentive to exert deal-specific effort with less concern about the possibility that the 
target would walk away from the deal after realizing the synergy. The acquirer has 
greater incentive in a challenged merger (than in an unchallenged one) to be involved in 
deal-specific efforts as it has to sign a consent decree requiring it to divest some assets or 
preventing it from forming business combinations in the future. Thus, I hypothesize the 
following,  
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H2: Conditional on the merger being challenged, the existence of target termination fees 
increases the probability that the merger will be completed by deterring competitive 
bidding. 
 
3.2.2. Method of Payment: 
Huang and Walkling (1987) state,  
“The form of payment will influence bidding strategy if it affects the anticipated net 
present value of an acquisition. Payment methods can affect net present values through 
interrelations with either acquisition cost (i.e., size of premium) or the probability of 
success, or both”.   
  They argue that in stock offers, the target will have time to implement a defensive 
strategy because stock offers take more time to get the approval of the Securities and 
Exchange relative to cash offers. Therefore, stock offers may have a lower probability of 
success than that of cash offers. They do not directly test this prediction. However, they 
report a statistically significant positive relation between target’s cumulative abnormal 
returns and cash payment. As for the bidder’s abnormal returns, Travlos (1987) finds that 
it is positive for cash offers and negative for stock offers and that this result is robust to 
the type (tender offer or merger) and outcome (successful or unsuccessful) of the deal. 
Travlos (1987) interprets the robustness of the negative (positive) reaction of stock offers 
(cash offers) to the deal outcome as evidence against the possibility that stock offers may 
be less likely to be completed. However, the negative abnormal return in stock offers is 
greater for unsuccessful than for successful deals. Therefore, the possibility that the 
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market may be perceiving mergers paid with stock to be less likely to be completed 
cannot be ruled out.    
 The literature offers several explanations for the asymmetric shareholder reaction 
across cash and stock offers. Hansen (1987) develops a model of bargaining under 
asymmetric information where the acquirer and target know their values but neither 
knows the value of the other. He shows that equilibrium can develop whereby the 
acquirer offers stock when it is overvalued and offers cash when it is undervalued. If 
either is the case, target shareholders lose: if they had accepted stock, they would have 
purchased shares for more than what they are worth, and if they had accepted cash, they 
would have lost the opportunity to gain from expected increase in bidder’s post-takeover 
value. Thus, the model predicts that target share price will decrease if the offer is 
accepted and increase if it is rejected. In Fishman (1987) model, cash is used to signal 
bidder’s high valuation of target assets rather than being an indication of bidder’s stock 
undervaluation as in Hansen (1987). Fishman (1987) concludes that the probability of a 
competing bid consequent to a stock offer is higher than that of a cash offer and that 
target shareholders are more likely to accept a cash offer rather than a stock offer. 
Consistent with this latter result, Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) find empirical evidence of 
negative relation between target resistance and percentage of offer represented by cash.  
The theoretical models of Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1987) do not allow for 
mixed offers (only some percentage of the offer is made with cash). The implications of 
this type of offers are theoretically addressed by Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel 
(1990). In the model, they derive a separating equilibrium in which the value of the 
bidder is revealed by the mix of cash and securities used as payment for the target. The 
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prediction is that the value of the bidder is monotonically increasing and convex in the 
fraction of the total offer that consists of cash. This prediction is in line with Hansen’s 
(1987) prediction that cash offers signal bidder undervaluation and empirical tests fail to 
support the implications of the Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel model. Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1990) also model a setting that allows for mixed offers and predict that as 
competition to acquire the target firm increases, the amount of cash used in financing 
takeovers increases. This prediction is consistent with Fishman (1987) prediction in that 
cash payment deters competition. Empirically, Walkling (1985) and Jennings and 
Mazzeo (1993) find some evidence that the use of cash increases the probability of 
takeover offer success.              
The theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence presented above may imply 
that acquisition deals paid in cash (or with some cash) are more likely to be completed 
than those paid entirely in stock. This implication applies to both challenged and 
unchallenged deals. However, I argue that cash payment is especially significant in 
completing unchallenged deals. My reasoning follows.  
Recall that previously, it was argued that the existence of target termination fees 
is likely to deter competition (the managerial entrenchment hypothesis) in merger 
proposals, and even more so when the deal is challenged by antitrust agencies, increasing 
the likelihood of merger completion. Here, I posit the same competition deterrence role 
of the cash offers as predicted by Fishman (1987) and empirically supported by Walkling 
(1985) and Jennings and Mazzeo (1993). In other words, target termination fees and 
payment with cash may serve as substitutes for each other. Officer (2003) finds evidence 
of negative relation between payment in cash and the existence of target termination fees. 
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He reports that a larger percentage of deals without target termination fees are paid fully 
or partly with cash than deals with target termination fees.18 Consequently, it is difficult 
to predict ex-ante which of these two variables (target termination fees vs. cash offer) 
will dominate in explaining acquisition deal completion. However, the success of 
challenged deal is contingent on, among other things, the cost of fulfilling government 
requirements as well as the acquirer’s willingness to comply with these requirements. 
Therefore, from the perspective of both acquirer’s and target’s shareholders a challenged 
deal is more uncertain than an unchallenged deal. From the view point of the acquirer of 
an challenged deal, the target termination fees may serve as a better substitute as 
deterrent to competitive offers than cash offers. This proposition leads me to hypothesize 
the following,   
 
H3: Conditional on the merger not being challenged, a merger paid in cash (or a 
combination of cash and stock) is more likely to be completed.    
 
3.2.3. Investment Opportunities: 
Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of the firm value to its replacement cost, has 
been used in the literature as a metric of firm’s investment opportunities, management 
efficiency, and information asymmetry. For the purpose of this dissertation, I use it as a 
measure of firm’s investment opportunities. Viewed in this sense, Tobin’s Q is a forward 
looking measure of a firm’s future growth opportunities that may justify its investments, 
                                                 
18 Officer (2003) also finds that the negative relation between the existence of target termination fees and 
the appearance of competing bid post initial bid is no longer significant after controlling for other variables 
including the payment with cash even when mixed with other securities. This result supports Fishman 
(1987) theoretical prediction that cash offers are less likely to be contested than stock offers.  
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including acquisitions. Consistent with this conjecture, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) 
argue that Tobin’s Q is an increasing function of the quality of a firm’s current and 
anticipated projects under existing management. They investigate announcement returns 
by dividing merger partners in terms of their Tobin’s Q. They find that bidder, target, and 
total returns are the highest when a high Q bidder takes over a low Q target in tender 
offers and Servaes (1991) finds that this result holds not only for tender offers but also for 
merger parties as well. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) present a model that predicts that 
firms with high investment opportunities will acquire those will low investment 
opportunities and that merger waves occur during times when dispersion in investment 
opportunities among firms increases. These results imply that Tobin’s Q also proxies for 
the improvements that acquirer is expected to introduce in managing target firm’s assets. 
Such improvements are predicted by Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) to increase the 
probability of deal success. Thus, I hypothesize        
 
H4: The higher the investment opportunities of the acquirer relative to those of the 
target, the higher is the probability of a merger completion irrespective of whether 
the merger is challenged or unchallenged. 
 
4. Variables Definitions: 
  The existence of target termination fees, the method of payment for the 
acquisition, and the final outcome of the deal are collected from the Securities Database 
Corporation (SDC) and verified by Lexis-Nexis search except for target termination fees. 
The SDC identifies an acquisition event as having target termination fees if the merger 
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parties have signed a merger agreement containing a statement that requires the target 
firm to pay certain amount of money to the acquiring firm if it chooses to cancel the deal. 
The merger deals that are challenged by the government are identified by Lexis-Nexis 
search. A deal is defined as challenged if the FTC, FCC, or DOJ required the merger 
parties to pursue a remedial action, if the merger parties cancelled the deal because of 
concerns about antitrust investigation, or if the regulatory agency succeeded in obtaining 
a preliminary injunction to block the deal.    
 The firm’s investment opportunities is measured by Tobin’s q and is calculated 
as,  
Tobin’s q = (market value of equity - book value of equity + total assets)/total assets 
 
 The Herfindahl Hirshman Index (henceforth, HHI) is calculated as,   
2
1
n
i
i
H α
=
=∑  
where iα  is the market share of firm i and n is the number of firms operating in the 
relevant market. The relevant market is defined as the SIC code that is determined as 
follows 
1. Primary SIC code of the acquirer and target if they match on the 4- digit or 3-digit 
level and the HHI is calculated using the sales of all firms that have such primary 
SIC code. To determine the merger impact on HHI, the HHI is recalculated after 
summing up the acquirer and target sales at the end of the year preceding the 
merger announcement year; or 
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2. If the acquirer and target primary SIC codes do not match, the relevant market is 
the acquirer and target divisional SIC code that matches on the 4-digit or 3-digit 
level. If the acquirer and target have more than one similar divisional SIC codes, the 
relevant market is the SIC code in which the HHI is the highest, and the HHI is 
calculated using the segment sales of all firms that operate a segment with such SIC 
code. The impact of HHI is determined by recalculating the HHI after summing up 
the acquirer and target relevant segment sales; or 
3. If neither the primary nor divisional SIC codes of the acquirer and target match on 
the 4-digit or 3-digit level, the relevant market is the target firm’s primary SIC 
code. The impact of the merger is determined by recalculating the HHI after 
dropping the target firm from its primary market. 
 
5. Methodology: 
 Almost every announcement of a merger or acquisition contains a clause that 
conditions the completion of the deal on the regulatory approval, among other things. 
Therefore, the decision making process of a merger deal completion can be viewed as a 
tree form as in Figure I, where the merger parties have to get the regulatory approval on 
the first stage and then decide the final outcome of the deal on the second stage. Such a 
decision making process can be modeled using a nested logit model. The nested logit 
model has the additional property of relaxing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
assumption (IIA) that underlies the standard logit model. This assumption means that the 
decision to make a particular choice is not affected by the existence of other choices. 
Therefore, if the IIA assumption fails to hold, the ratio of the probabilities of any two 
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choices will not be independent from the remaining probabilities. Consequently, using a 
standard logit model will produce inefficient parameter estimates. The IIA assumption is 
unlikely to hold in an acquisition completion decision setting because an acquiring (or 
target) firm that is involved in a challenged merger may choose to cancel the deal and 
seek acquiring (or getting acquired by) a different firm that is unlikely to raise antitrust 
concerns. Thus, the decision to cancel a challenged acquisition deal may be affected by 
the existence of other firms that can be acquired (or get acquired by) without being 
challenged. In fact, some acquiring and target firms that cancelled the merger attempt due 
to regulatory concerns actually announced that they will be seeking mergers with other 
firms.  
 I assume that both the acquiring and target firms have a common (combined) 
utility function and that both will jointly choose the final outcome of the deal (complete 
or cancel) that maximizes the common utility function. This assumption holds, at least, 
for friendly mergers where both parties are willing to do what it takes to facilitate the 
process (including complying with regulatory requirements, should there be any). 
Although the upper level choice in Figure I is made by the government and the lower 
level choice is made by the merger parties, the whole decision making process can still be 
assumed solely the merger parties’ because, first, merger guidelines have become so 
transparent that merger parties can predict with reasonable accuracy whether or not a 
proposed merger attempt will be challenged by the government (Johnson and Parkman, 
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1991).19 Second, even if the merger was challenged, merger parties can still complete the 
merger provided that they comply with the regulatory requirements.  
The acquiring and target firms’ common utility function is assumed to take the 
following form,  
                                                            ij ij ijU V ε= +                                                          (1) 
{ }1, 2,...,i C∈  
{ }1, 2,..., ij N∈  
where ijU  is the utility function from choice j from the choice set i, ijV  is a function of all 
measured characteristics and ijε  is a residual that captures the effects of unmeasured 
variables and is independently and identically distributed with extreme value distribution. 
Then, the probability ijP  that the alternative (i, j) will be chosen is given by,  
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I assume that, 
                                                     ' 'ij ij iV X Yβ α= +                                                       (3) 
where ijX is the vector of explanatory variables for the final outcome of the deal and iY  
is the vector of explanatory variables for the regulatory decision.  
Under these assumptions, the joint probability can be written as,  
                                                            Pij = Pj│i . Pi                                                      (4) 
                                                 
19 With the passage of the HSR Act, merger regulations have become dramatically transparent. This 
transparency eliminates much of the uncertainty regarding a) whether the DOJ or FTC will challenge a 
merger, b) the duration of Antitrust proceedings, c) and the type of remedial action they might be asked to 
implement, should they be required to do so (Johnson and Parkman, 1991). 
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where Pi is the marginal probability of choosing the regulatory reaction and Pj│i is the 
conditional probability of choosing the final outcome conditional on the regulatory 
decision.  
The conditional probability Pj│i is  
                                                 Pj│i = eβ’Xij ⁄ eλIi                                                      (5) 
and the marginal probability iP  is, 20  
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is the inclusive value and represents the expected value of the subset i. λ  is the 
coefficient of the inclusive value and reflects the dissimilarity of the lower level choice. 
Modeling the decision making process as in figure I and using the nested logit model is 
appropriate if the coefficient of the inclusive value is different from 1.21 If λ =1, the 
nested logit model reduces to a multinomial model. For 0<λ < 1, the model fails to 
satisfy the IIA property but it does satisfy the properties required for random utility. For 
                                                 
20 Another way to write equations (5) and (6) is, 
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If Yi and/or Xij contain (s) firm specific terms that are the same for the same firm across all choices, they 
drop out of the probability function. Therefore, to allow for firm specific variables, I use a method 
suggested by Greene (2003) by adding an indicator variable for one choice on each subset and interacting it 
with the firm specific variable.  
21 See Maddala (1983) page 70.  
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λ  outside the unit interval, the probabilities are still well defined (Hausman and 
McFadden, 1984). The parameter vectors 'α  and 'β in equation (3) can be estimated by 
full information maximum likelihood or sequentially by limited information maximum 
likelihood. I use the full information maximum likelihood because it produces more 
efficient parameter estimates.22 
 
6. Data and sample: 
 The initial sample of mergers and acquisitions is obtained from the Securities 
Database Corporation (SDC) over the period 1990-2002. I select the mergers and 
acquisitions where the acquirer and target are U.S public firms and exclude firms in the 
financial industry (i.e. firms with SIC code 6000-6999) because the financial variables of 
these firms are not directly comparable to those of other firms. I include only those 
acquisitions where the acquirer seeks to end up controlling the target firm by holding 
more than 50% of its outstanding shares after the transaction23 and exclude acquisitions 
where the acquirer had a controlling stake in the target prior to the merger. Leverage 
buyouts, management buyouts, and cases where the target firm ends up a private firm are 
excluded. To be in the sample, both the acquiring and target firms must have data on the 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. Finally, only acquisition deals that are reportable 
under the HSR Act are included and, therefore, acquisition cases where the sum of the 
acquirer and target assets (sales) at the end of the year preceding the announcement year 
                                                 
22 See Greene (2003) page 727. 
23 Less than controlling ownership in the target firm is not likely to trigger government scrutiny. For 
example, the FTC let Lockheed Martin’s acquisition of 49% of Comsat to go through without conditions.   
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is less than $110 million and acquisitions where the transactions value24 is less than $50 
million are excluded.25 This screening process results in 1416 acquisition deals. These 
deals are, then, searched on Lexis-Nexis to verify the incidence of acquisition event, the 
announcement date of the deal, its final outcome, the method of payment, and whether 
the acquisition parties had signed a definitive merger or acquisition agreement before 
deciding the final outcome of the deal.26 From the Lexis-Nexis search, I find that some of 
the deals that the SDC reports as acquisitions are not actually acquisition deals. Instead, 
those cases are: strategic alliances, sales of convertible debt, sales of series B stock or 
preferred stock, purchasing an option to purchase target firm’s stock, or some kind of 
business combinations between the acquirer and target firms. After excluding those 
observations the final sample drops to 1139 completed and cancelled acquisition deals. 
 To identify acquisition deals challenged by the government, I search the 
newswires compiled in Lexis-Nexis for announcements of such deals.27 I define a deal as 
challenged if the FTC, FCC, or DOJ required the acquisition parties to pursue a remedial 
                                                 
24 SDC defines the transaction value as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees 
and expenses. The dollar value includes the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, 
preferred stock, debt, options, assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six months of the 
announcement date of the acquisition.  
25 The HSR Act requires both the acquiring and the acquired entities to file notification if all the following 
conditions are met: (a) one entity has sales or assets of at least $100 million; (b) the other entity has sales or 
assets of at least $10 million; and (c) as a result of the transaction, the acquiring entity will hold an 
aggregate amount of stock and assets of the acquired entity valued at more than $50 million; or (d) as a 
result of the transaction, the acquiring entity will hold an aggregate amount of stock and assets of the 
acquired entity valued at more than $200 million, regardless of the sales or assets of the acquiring  and 
acquired entity. 
26 For this search, I use the bidder and target names and merger, acquisition, offer, or bid as search terms.  
27 To identify the challenged deals from Lexis-Nexis, I use the bidder and target names and FCC, FTC, or 
department of justice as search terms. To verify the accuracy of my search algorithm, I cross reference the 
challenged deals specified by this search algorithm with the acquisition deals on the FTC website for the 
period 1996-2002 and with the challenged horizontal deals provided by Shawn Thomas from his sample in 
Fee and Thomas (2004) for the period 1990-1996. I find that my search algorithm can identify each and 
every challenged deal that appears on the FTC website and in Fee and Thomas (2004) sample. In the 
Appendix, I provide brief details about the challenged acquisition deals collected from Lexis-Nexis, the 
FTC website, and WSJ.    
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action, if the merger parties cancelled the deal because of concerns about antitrust 
investigation, or if the regulatory agency succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunction to 
block the deal. The inclusion of target termination fees in a merger deal is determined 
from the SDC. Articles published around the acquisition announcement date are collected 
by searching the Wall Street Journal and Lexis-Nexis news wires. 
Panel A of Table I shows that the sample is dominated by mergers that were 
completed without being challenged and that the percentage of cancelled mergers among 
challenged deals is higher than that among unchallenged deals. The sample period has 
been ended in 2002 because in 2002 the assets and/or sales thresholds have been 
amended for the acquisition to qualify for merger notification under the HSR Act. Also, 
acquisitions of foreign entities by U.S firms or foreign entity’s acquisition of U.S firm 
have become qualified for notification provided that they satisfy the required thresholds. 
Panel B of Table I shows the distribution of the sample acquisitions across the sample 
period of 1990-2002. The sharp increase in the number of acquisitions during the second 
half of the 1990s is consistent with the documented merger wave of the 1990s which 
starts to dissipate after the turn of the century. The challenged deals do not include 
acquisition deals where the FTC granted early termination of the HSR waiting period or 
terminated its investigation after a second review had been issued. The peak of the 
number of challenged deals in 1998 is consistent with reports released by the Bureau of 
competition of the FTC that year 1998 was the most active year in terms of the number of 
merger cases reviewed by the FTC. Of the 93 merger attempts that were challenged, 62 
are challenged by the FTC, 18 by the DOJ, 10 by the FCC, one by both the DOJ and 
FCC, and one by the pentagon. In 52 challenged and completed cases, merger parties are 
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Table I: Panel A shows the distribution of 1139 challenged and unchallenged acquisitions between completed and 
cancelled deals. Panel B shows the distribution of these deals across the period 1990-2002 broken down into completed 
and cancelled deals. The acquisition deals are obtained from the Securities Database Corporation (SDC). Challenged 
deals are identified by searching the newswires compiled in Lexis-Nexis. A deal is defined as challenged if the FTC, 
FCC, or DOJ required the acquisition parties to pursue a remedial action, if the merger parties cancelled the deal 
because of concerns about antitrust investigation, or if the regulatory agency succeeded in obtaining preliminary 
injunction to block the deal. Panel C shows the distribution of acquisitions across industries where the industry is 
defined at the two digit SIC level and the acquisition is classified as same industry if the acquirer and targets firms have 
the same two digit primary SIC code. Panel D shows mean and median values for transaction value, Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) in the year preceding the announcement date, and change in HHI that the acquisition results in, 
and percentage of deals that fall in the classification shown in the first column. Dollar amounts are denominated in 
millions.   
Panel A: Distribution of acquisitions between completed and cancelled  
 
Unchallenged acquisitions 
 
Challenged acquisitions 
 
 
Deal outcome 
 
N 
 
% N % 
Completed 
 
904 86.42 72 77.42 
Cancelled 
 
142 13.58 21 22.58 
Total 
 
1046 100.00 93 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution of acquisitions across sample period  
 Number of acquisitions 
 
 Unchallenged acquisitions 
 
Challenged acquisitions 
Year 
 
Completed Cancelled Completed Cancelled 
1990 16 4 1 0 
1991 16 3 0 0 
1992 17 2 0 0 
1993 30 12 3 1 
1994 33 14 9 1 
1995 62 12 5 1 
1996 74 13 8 3 
1997 111 10 5 4 
1998 131 16 15 1 
1999 155 24 12 5 
2000 123 17 8 1 
2001 85 11 3 3 
2002 51 4 3 1 
Total 904 142 72 21 
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required to actually sell selected assets, in 8 cases parties have to sell rights to produce 
some products or license patents to a third party named by the government, and in 5 cases 
the acquirer or the resulting firm is restricted from acquiring interests in selected 
industries. Other remedial actions include delegating voting rights or transferring 
holdings in another firm to a trustee appointed by the FTC to sell those holding to a third 
party (2 cases), creating a new competitor (2 cases), terminating selected business 
agreements (1 case), making changes in internal operations (1 case), and canceling some 
business agreements and allowing a target’s competitor equal access to cable (Time 
Warner’s acquisition of Turner Broadcasting).28 
 
7. Descriptive Statistics:   
 The distribution of the same industry acquisition deals across industries in Panel 
C of Table I does not show any clear industry clustering except for the business services 
industry that went through a relatively huge consolidation activity. This pattern continues 
to be seen when the deal is not challenged. Mergers in the communications, chemicals 
and allied products, petroleum and coal products, and retail trade industries show more 
prevalent government involvement as these industries have relatively higher percentage 
of challenged deals. Only the communication industry is regulated, thus, there is no 
sufficient indication that mergers in regulated industries may be subject to heavier 
government scrutiny. Most of the acquisitions take place between parties in the same 
                                                 
28 Eckbo (1985) identifies 98 challenged (80 horizontal) merger cases in the mining and manufacturing 
industries where a divestiture was ordered in 50 cases over the period 1963-1981 and Fee and Thomas 
(2003) identify 39 challeged horizontal cases over the period 1980-1997. 
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industry and a larger percentage of deals are challenged by the government when the 
merger parties are in the same industry than when they are in different industries.     
Panel D of Table I shows that the median transaction value of a challenged and 
completed deal is more than ten times higher than that of an unchallenged and completed 
deal while the transaction value of a challenged and cancelled deal is only five times 
higher than that of an unchallenged and cancelled deal. The larger transaction value of a 
challenged deal may be due to larger size targets, higher bid premium offered by the 
acquirer, or both. Following Officer (2003), I use two measures of the bid premium 
because the premiums computed using SDC data are noisy containing large outliers. The 
first measure is the total compensation paid to the target deflated by the target’s market 
value 42 days prior to the bid announcement day less one. The second measure is the 
share price paid to the target as reported by SDC deflated by the target’s share price 42 
days prior to the bid announcement less one. The bid premium is equal to the first 
measure if it is greater than zero and less than two and equal to the second measure if the 
first is missing and the value of the second measure is between zero and two. The median 
bid premium is about 70% of the target firm’s value for completed deals whether the deal 
was challenged or not while it is more than 90% for a challenged and cancelled deal 
compared to less than 50% for an unchallenged and cancelled deal. The market 
concentration in which a merger is attempted is low (median HHI is 0.123 for completed 
acquisitions and 0.130 for cancelled acquisitions) and is expected to result in either no 
change or very small change in market concentration (median change in HHI is 0.00 for 
completed acquisitions and 0.002 for cancelled acquisitions). However, classifying the 
mergers into challenged and unchallenged deals reveals that challenged mergers are  
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Panel C: Distribution of acquisitions across industries 
 
Industry Name (2-digit SIC) 
All acquisitions 
 
Unchallenged 
acquisitions 
Challenged 
acquisitions 
 
 
 
N 
 
% 
  
 
Agricultural services (07) 
 
1 
 
0.09 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Oil and gas extraction (13) 
 
36 
 
3.17 
 
36 
 
0 
 
Other Mining (10 and 14) 
 
4 
 
0.35 
 
4 
 
0 
 
General building contractors (15) 
 
7 
 
0.62 
 
7 
 
0 
 
Food and kindred products (20) 
 
21 
 
1.85 
 
20 
 
1 
 
Other manufacturing (22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, and 34) 
 
23 
 
2.02 
 
22 
 
1 
 
Paper and allied products (26) 
 
10 
 
0.88 
 
8 
 
2 
 
Printing and publishing (27) 
 
10 
 
0.88 
 
9 
 
1 
 
Chemicals and allied products (28) 
 
61 
 
5.35 
 
52 
 
9 
 
Petroleum and coal products (29) 
 
6 
 
0.52 
 
1 
 
5 
 
Primary metal industries (33) 
 
16 
 
1.41 
 
15 
 
1 
 
Industrial machinery and equipment (35) 
 
49 
 
4.31 
 
47 
 
2 
 
Electronic and other electric equipment (36) 
 
52 
 
4.57 
 
50 
 
2 
 
Transportation equipment (37) 
 
17 
 
1.50 
 
14 
 
3 
 
Instruments and related products (38) 
 
55 
 
4.84 
 
50 
 
5 
 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries (39)   
 
9 
 
0.79 
 
8 
 
1 
 
Other transportation (40, 42, 45, and 47) 
 
18 
 
1.58 
 
17 
 
1 
 
Communication (48) 
 
73 
 
6.41 
 
59 
 
14 
 
Electric, gas, and sanitary services (49) 
 
50 
 
4.40 
 
46 
 
4 
 
Wholesale trade (50, and 51) 
 
21 
 
1.85 
 
19 
 
2 
 
Retail trade (52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, and 59) 
 
46 
 
4.05 
 
39 
 
7 
 
Other services (70, 72, 75, 78, 82, 83, and 87) 
 
16 
 
1.41 
 
15 
 
1 
 
Business services (73) 
 
152 
 
13.37 
 
144 
 
8 
 
Amusement and recreation services (79) 
 
13 
 
1.14 
 
13 
 
0 
 
Health services (80) 
 
30 
 
2.64 
 
27 
 
3 
 
Total same industry acquisitions 
 
796 
 
70 
 
723 
 
73 
 
Cross industry acquisitions 
 
343 
 
30 
 
323 
 
20 
 
Total 
 
1139 
 
100 
 
1046 
 
93 
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Panel D: Mean and median values for transaction value, HHI in the year preceding the announcement date, and change 
in HHI that the acquisition results in, and percentage of deals that fall in the classification shown in the first column. 
  
All acquisitions 
 
Unchallenged acquisitions 
 
Challenged acquisitions 
  
Completed 
 
Cancelled 
 
Completed 
 
Cancelled 
 
Completed 
 
Cancelled 
 
Mean transaction value 
 
1874.39 
 
1972.77 
 
1081.36 
 
1902.03 
 
11787.25 
 
2420.75 
 
Median transaction value 
 
339.57 
 
402.77 
 
303.73 
 
356.86 
 
4169.07 
 
1905.36 
 
Mean bid premium 
 
0.7880 
 
0.6189 
 
0.7845 
 
0.5733 
 
0.8326 
 
0.8829 
 
Median bid premium 
 
0.7169 
 
0.4799 
 
0.7171 
 
0.4660 
 
0.7007 
 
0.9162 
 
Mean HHI before merger 
 
0.164 
 
0.177 
 
0.167 
 
0.176 
 
0.130 
 
0.190 
 
Median HHI before merger 
 
0.123 
 
0.130 
 
0.124 
 
0.125 
 
0.099 
 
0.160 
 
Mean change in HHI 
 
0.009 
 
0.018 
 
0.009 
 
0.011 
 
0.016 
 
0.064 
 
Median change in HHI 
 
0 
 
0.002 
 
0 
 
0.002 
 
0.007 
 
0.020 
 
Percentage of deals paid with 
cash only 
 
 
22.8% 
 
 
27.6% 
 
 
23.8% 
 
 
28.2% 
 
 
11.1% 
 
 
23.8% 
 
Percentage of deals paid with 
stock only 
 
 
40.4% 
 
 
39.9% 
 
 
40.5% 
 
 
42.3% 
 
 
38.9% 
 
 
23.8% 
 
Percentage of deals with target 
termination fess 
 
 
75.4% 
 
 
30.7% 
 
 
75.3% 
 
 
25.4% 
 
 
76.4% 
 
 
66.7% 
 
Percentage of deals with 
multiple bidders 
 
 
5.1% 
 
 
25.8% 
 
 
5.1% 
 
 
28.9% 
 
 
5.6% 
 
 
4.8% 
 
Percentage of targets firms 
with poison pill in place 
 
 
0.9% 
 
 
7.4% 
 
 
1.0% 
 
 
8.5% 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
Percentage of deals with lock 
up option 
 
 
16.5% 
 
 
9.8% 
 
 
16.6% 
 
 
8.5% 
 
 
15.3% 
 
 
19.0% 
 
expected to result in greater change in market concentration relative to unchallenged 
mergers as the median change in HHI is 0.007 for completed acquisitions and 0.02 for 
cancelled acquisitions. The mean and median values of the merger-induced change in 
HHI for all the challenged cases are 0.0078 and 0.0266, respectively. These values 
confirm Eckbo (1985) results who finds that challenged horizontal mergers induce a 
mean and median change in HHI of 0.01 and 0.033, respectively. The stock is more 
prevalent method of payment than pure cash payment as about 40% of the deals are paid 
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for with only stock regardless of whether the deal is challenged or not. Target termination 
fees are included in more than 70% of merger deals with the exception of unchallenged 
yet cancelled deals where only 25.4% of them include termination fess payable by the 
target. This observation is consistent with the results of the empirical research that finds 
that acquisition deals that include target termination fees are more likely to be completed. 
The unchallenged and cancelled deals also represent the highest percentage of contested 
ones and the lowest percentage of deals with target termination fees or lock up option. A 
lock up option gives the acquirer the right to buy target firm’s shares at a specified price 
if the deal fails. It is another mechanism beside target termination fees that the acquirer 
can use to lock the target firm in the deal. The poison pill is rarely used by the target firm 
as an antitakeover measure as less than 10% of targets involved in unchallenged mergers 
and none of the targets involved in challenged merger has a poison pill in place.       
 Because the number of challenged deals is smaller than that of unchallenged 
deals, the following discussion is based on median differences rather than mean 
differences. Panels A and B of Table II show the descriptive statistics for acquirers and 
targets of unchallenged and challenged acquisitions and median difference tests of 
selected variables. Acquirers and targets of challenged deals are much larger than their 
counterparts of unchallenged acquisition deals and have higher sales. This result is 
expected since the government is more likely to challenge acquisitions proposed by 
parties whose sum of sales or assets would result in increasing market concentration.  
 Acquirers of challenged acquisitions have significantly higher free cash flows but 
significantly lower leverage ratio, lower investment opportunities, and lower market-to- 
book ratio than acquirers of unchallenged acquisitions. Targets of challenged 
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acquisitions, on the other hand, are more levered and have significantly higher investment 
opportunities and market- to-book ratio than targets of unchallenged mergers. In Panels C 
and D of Table II, I classify the unchallenged deals into completed and cancelled deals.  
Table II: Panels A and B present the summary statistics for acquirers and targets involved in unchallenged 
and challenged acquisitions. Panels C and D present the summary statistics for acquirers and targets 
involved in unchallenged completed and cancelled acquisitions. Panels E and F present the summary 
statistics for acquirers and targets involved in challenged completed and cancelled acquisitions. All 
summary statistics are calculated at the end of the year preceding the year of acquisition announcement 
date. Free cash flow (FCF) is calculated as operating income before depreciation – interest expense – 
income taxes – capital expenditures. Leverage is calculated as (long term debt + current portion of long 
term debt) / (total assets + book value of equity + market value of common equity). Market value of 
common equity is calculated as the product of number of shares outstanding and the fiscal year closing 
stock price. Tobin’s q is calculated as (market value of common equity – book value of equity + total 
assets)/(total assets). PPE is the plant, property, and equipment. Dollar amounts are denominated in 
millions.  
Panel A: Acquirers 
Variables Unchallenged acquisitions 
 
Challenged acquisitions p-value for 
median 
difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median  
 
Total assets 
 
7064.86 
 
1259.04 
 
11764.25 
 
4096.10 
 
0.00 
 
Sales 
 
5402.74 
 
1046.15 
 
10361.02 
 
3797.00 
 
0.00 
 
FCF/Total assets 
 
1.85% 
 
3.96% 
 
2.78% 
 
4.81% 
 
0.007 
 
Leverage 
 
14.34% 
 
10.42% 
 
13.48% 
 
10.85% 
 
0.014 
 
PPE/Total assets 
 
28.89% 
 
21.09% 
 
30.29% 
 
25.30% 
 
0.593 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
3.25 
 
1.96 
 
3.11 
 
2.31 
 
0.00 
 
M/B 
 
7.98 
 
3.22 
 
4.60 
 
3.44 
 
0.003 
Panel B: Targets      
 
Total assets 
 
800.55 
 
170.08 
 
4723.49 
 
1476.00 
 
0.00 
 
Sales 
 
762.65 
 
170.44 
 
4476.00 
 
1001.56 
 
0.00 
 
FCF/Total assets 
 
-2.56% 
 
1.73% 
 
0.78% 
 
2.76% 
 
0. 484 
 
Leverage 
 
17.12% 
 
11.65% 
 
18.66% 
 
18.18% 
 
0.052 
 
PPE/Total asset 
 
28.66% 
 
20.52% 
 
30.34% 
 
24.73% 
 
0.728 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
2.42 
 
1.54 
 
2.45 
 
1.63 
 
0.00 
 
M/B 
 
3.54 
 
2.09 
 
4.13 
 
2.59 
 
0.00 
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Acquirers of unchallenged and completed deals have significantly higher sales than 
acquirers of unchallenged and cancelled deals but are comparable in terms of their 
assets,free cash flows, leverage, plant property and equipment, investment opportunities,  
Table II continued, 
Panel C: Acquirers of unchallenged acquisitions 
Variables Completed acquisitions 
 
Cancelled acquisitions p-value for 
median 
difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median  
 
Total Assets 
 
7261.53 
 
1342.16 
 
5812.85 
 
782.21 
 
0.597 
 
Sales 
 
5759.64 
 
1127.44 
 
3130.62 
 
637.84 
 
0.00 
 
FCF/Total assets 
 
2.41% 
 
4.24% 
 
0.13% 
 
2.02% 
 
0.165 
 
Leverage 
 
13.69% 
 
9.54% 
 
18.48% 
 
16.67% 
 
0.143 
 
PPE/Total assets 
 
28.34% 
 
20.65% 
 
32.44% 
 
24.75% 
 
0.294 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
3.35 
 
2.02 
 
2.56 
 
1.68 
 
0.303 
 
M/B 
 
8.56 
 
3.29 
 
4.30 
 
2.72 
 
0.250 
Panel D: Targets of unchallenged acquisitions 
 
Total assets 
 
615.17 
 
157.91 
 
1926.56 
 
305.61 
 
0.00 
 
Sales 
 
575.96 
 
155.37 
 
1951.15 
 
310.47 
 
0.00 
 
FCF/Total assets 
 
-3.14% 
 
1.73% 
 
0.88% 
 
1.73% 
 
0.422 
 
Leverage 
 
16.64% 
 
10.71% 
 
20.13% 
 
16.90% 
 
0.235 
 
PPE/Total assets 
 
27.95% 
 
19.75% 
 
32.17% 
 
27.340 
 
0.045 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
2.45 
 
1.56 
 
2.24 
 
1.46 
 
0.089 
 
M/B 
 
3.50 
 
2.12 
 
3.81 
 
1.95 
 
0.073 
 
and market-to-book ratios. Targets of unchallenged and completed deals have 
significantly less assets and sales and lower plant property and equipment and investment 
opportunities than those of targets of unchallenged and cancelled deals. 
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Panels E and F of Table II classify the challenged deals into completed and 
cancelled acquisitions. Both acquirers and targets of challenged and completed deals are 
not significantly different from their counter parts of challenged and cancelled deals in 
terms of assets, sales, free cash flows, leverage, investment opportunities, plant, property,  
Table II continued, 
Panel E: Acquirers of challenged acquisitions 
Variables Completed acquisitions 
 
Cancelled acquisitions p-value for 
median 
difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median  
 
Total assets 
 
13744.98 
 
5309.10 
 
4973.17 
 
2472.61 
 
0.181 
 
Sales 
 
11723.52 
 
4353.07 
 
5689.62 
 
3638.81 
 
0.106 
 
FCF/Total assets 
 
1.35% 
 
3.75% 
 
8.23% 
 
6.96% 
 
0.136 
 
Leverage 
 
13.15% 
 
11.12% 
 
14.64% 
 
8.33% 
 
0.765 
 
PPE/Total assets 
 
32.92% 
 
27.35% 
 
21.27% 
 
16.20% 
 
0.575 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
3.19 
 
2.31 
 
2.86 
 
2.26 
 
0.232 
 
M/B 
 
4.62 
 
3.43 
 
4.53 
 
4.09 
 
0.823 
Panel F: Targets of challenged acquisitions 
 
Total assets 
 
5592.39 
 
1718.55 
 
1744.41 
 
1187.96 
 
0.903 
 
Sales 
 
5040.44 
 
1007.48 
 
2540.77 
 
721.35 
 
0.289 
 
FCF/Total assets 
 
0.92% 
 
2.01% 
 
0.34% 
 
3.82% 
 
0.145 
 
Leverage 
 
19.20% 
 
17.88% 
 
16.80% 
 
17.79% 
 
0.911 
 
PPE/Total asset 
 
32.48% 
 
27.71% 
 
23.02% 
 
17.45% 
 
0.391 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
2.46 
 
1.65 
 
2.45 
 
1.57 
 
0.550 
 
M/B 
 
4.78 
 
2.62 
 
1.92 
 
2.25 
 
0.911 
 
and equipment, or market-to-book ratio. The reason why the target firm is larger in a 
cancelled deal than in a completed deal for the unchallenged deals may be due to the fact 
that larger targets are harder to acquire. 
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8. Market Reaction:  
Panel A of Table III shows that when an unchallenged deal that is eventually 
completed is announced, acquirers lose a median value of less than 1% while the targets 
gain about 15% over one day period before announcement. However, when an 
unchallenged merger that is eventually cancelled is announced, acquirers lose 1.52% and 
targets gain 7.58%. Lower gains to targets of cancelled deals may be attributed to 
market’s ability to anticipate that the deal would fail. Panel B of Table III shows that the  
Table III: Panels A and C show the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement of 
unchallenged and challenged acquisition deals, respectively, for the event windows shown in the second 
column and classified according to the final outcome of the deal. Panels B and D show the CARs around 
the announcement of the final outcome of the deal for unchallenged and challenged deals, respectively. 
CAR is calculated using the standard event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) with the 
value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms is used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The market model 
parameters are estimated using returns of 155 days ending 45 days before the date of announcement.    
Panel A: Stock price reaction at the announcement of an unchallenged acquisition deal 
 
Deal outcome 
 
Event window 
 
Acquirer CAR 
 
 
Target CAR 
  Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
 
Completed 
 
(-1,0) 
 
-1.75a 
 
-0.98a 
 
19.94a 
 
14.90 a 
  
(-5,0) 
 
-1.53a 
 
-1.25 a 
 
22.90 a 
 
18.61 a 
 
Cancelled 
 
(-1,0) 
 
-2.29 a 
 
-1.52 a 
 
9.58 a 
 
7.58 a 
  
(-5,0) 
 
 
-1.72 a 
 
-1.43b 
 
12. 37 a 
 
8.78 a 
Panel B: Stock price reaction at the announcement of the final outcome for unchallenged acquisition deal 
 
Deal outcome 
 
Event window 
 
Acquirer CAR 
 
 
Target CAR 
  Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
 
Completed 
 
(-1,0) 
 
0.48 a 
 
0.28 b 
 
0.31 b 
 
-0.17 
  
(-5,0) 
 
0.22 
 
0.08 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.34 
 
Cancelled 
 
(-1,0) 
 
0.53 b 
 
-0.18 
 
-3.74 a 
 
-1.09 a 
  
(-5,0) 
 
 
-1.67 b 
 
-0.69 
 
-5.60 a 
 
-1.59 b 
a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
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Table III continued,  
Panel C: Stock price reaction at the announcement of a challenged acquisition deal 
 
Deal outcome 
 
Event window 
 
Acquirer CAR 
 
 
Target CAR 
  Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
 
Completed 
 
(-1,0) 
 
-2.26a 
 
-1.98a 
 
15.89a 
 
7.75 a 
  
(-5,0) 
 
-2.59a 
 
-2.69 a 
 
18.23 a 
 
12.80 a 
 
Cancelled 
 
(-1,0) 
 
-0.17  
 
0.52  
 
14.53 a 
 
11.60 a 
  
(-5,0) 
 
 
1.40 b 
 
3.95 
 
15.48 a 
 
14.21 a 
Panel D: Stock price reaction at the announcement of the final outcome for a challenged acquisition deal 
 
Deal outcome 
 
Event window 
 
Acquirer CAR 
 
 
Target CAR 
  Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) 
 
Completed 
 
(-1,0) 
 
0.25 
 
0.51 
 
0 
 
0.17 
  
(-5,0) 
 
0.36 
 
0.53 
 
0.16 
 
0.02 
 
Cancelled 
 
(-1,0) 
 
0.45 
 
1.09 
 
-11.82 a 
 
-7.29 a 
  
(-5,0) 
 
 
-1.68 
 
-0.61 
 
-18.17 a 
 
-12.21 a 
a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
 
announcement of completing of an unchallenged merger does not elicit any significant 
market reaction. However, when cancellation of such a merger is announced the target 
firm loses 1.09%. Panel C of Table III shows that the target firm reaps a median value of 
7.75% and acquirers lose about 2% upon the announcement of a challenged deal that is 
eventually completed. The announcement of challenged deals that are later cancelled is 
greeted as more favorable news as it results in targets gaining a return of 11.60% which is 
about 4% higher than what they gain when a completed deal is announced. Like the 
announcement of completing an unchallenged deal, the announcement of completing a 
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challenged deal does not bring about any significant market reaction. When cancellation 
of a challenged deal is announced, targets lose 7.29% of their stock value that represents 
61.78% of what they gained when the deal was announced compared to the loss of only 
14.38% by targets when the cancellation of an unchallenged deal is announced. Thus, 
canceling an acquisition deal due to regulatory reason appears to be less anticipated by 
investors than canceling an acquisition deal for other reasons. 
Whether the merger was challenged or not, the market reaction of target stock 
upon announcing completing or canceling the deal does not support Hansen’s (1986) 
predictions that target firms lose if the deal is completed and gain if it is cancelled. In 
fact, upon canceling a merger deal target stock price reacts negatively and shows no 
significant change when the deal is completed whether the deal is challenged or not. 
Thus, these results do not support the argument that the method of payment signals the 
bidder’s stock under- or overvaluation. 
In Table IV, I investigate the sources of value gains around the announcement of 
an acquisition. The dependent variable is the combined two-day cumulative abnormal 
return for the acquirer and target firms calculated as the sum of the market value 
weighted cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer and target. As shown in model 1, 
merger deals that end up being completed, paid for in cash, and deals that are expected to 
increase market share have higher value gains while the higher the acquiring firm’s size 
relative to the target firm’s size the lower is the value gain. The market reaction is not 
different between challenged and unchallenged deals including target termination fees or 
whether the merger is between firms in the same industry or different industries does not 
affect the combined value change at the announcement. In models 2, 3, and 4, I include  
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Table IV: OLS regression of the determinants of the combined value change of the acquiring and target 
firms at the announcement of the merger. The dependent variable is the two-day combined cumulative 
abnormal return (-1,0)  of the acquiring and target firms calculated as the sum of market value weighted 
cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer and target where the market value is calculated at the end of 
the year preceding the announcement date. Deal completed dummy is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the deal has been completed and zero otherwise, Challenged deal dummy is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the deal has been challenged and zero otherwise. Cash merger dummy is a dummy variable if the 
method of payment is only cash. Same industry is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the acquirer and 
target have the same 2-digit primary SIC code and zero otherwise. Challenged_Cash merger is the 
interaction term for the challenged deal that are paid with only cash. Challenged_Per_change in HHI is the 
interaction term for the challenged deals and the percentage change in HHI. Challenged_Target termination 
fees is the interaction term for the challenged deals that include target termination fees. All other variables 
are as defined earlier. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Constant 
 
0.009  
 
0.009  
 
0.009  
 
0.009  
 
Deal completed dummy 
 
0.012 c 
 
0.012 c 
 
0.012 c 
 
0.013 c 
 
Deal challenged dummy 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.013 
 
Cash merger dummy 
 
0.022 a 
 
0.022 a 
 
0.022 a 
 
0.023 a 
 
Relative size 
 
-0.006 a 
 
-0.006 a 
 
-0.006 a 
 
-0.006 a 
 
Percentage change in HHI 
 
0.059 a 
 
0.059 a 
 
0.059 a 
 
0.060a 
 
Same industry dummy 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
Target termination fees dummy 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
-.0.008 
 
Challenged_Cash nerger 
  
0.011 
 
 
 
 
Challenged_Per_change in HHI 
   
0.036 
 
 
Challenged_Target termination fees 
    
0.015 
a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
 
an interaction term for the challenged deals that are paid in cash, challenged and the 
change in HHI, and challenged deals and the inclusion of target termination fees. The 
positive impact of cash mergers and increase in HHI on the announcement returns is not 
different for challenged deals. 
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9. Results: 
9.1. Explaining the choice between completing and canceling an acquisition deal 
conditional on regulatory decision: 
 The most important factor that the government employs when deciding whether 
or not to challenge an acquisition attempt is the change in HHI that the merger is 
expected to result in especially when the relevant market is highly concentrated.29 
Therefore, when testing for the effect of the change in HHI on the first stage, I use the 
percentage change in HHI and control for the acquiring firm’s size. In addition, I control 
for regulated industries because a regulated industry may be subject to more government 
scrutiny and for the industry in which the merger is attempted because some industries 
may be more scrutinized than others. The government may be more lenient towards 
acquisitions by U.S firms when the relevant industry is dominated by foreign firms. Thus, 
I control for the market share held by foreign firms. As shown in Panel A of Table V 
model 1, the percentage change in HHI and the acquirer’s size are positively related to 
the probability of challenging the deal controlling for acquirer industry, regulated 
industry, and market share held by foreign firms. In other words, mergers attempted by 
larger acquirers that are expected to result in larger increase in market concentration are 
more likely to be challenged. Furthermore, the government’s decision to challenge a 
merger deal is not affected by the type of the industry in which the merger is attempted, 
whether the industry is regulated, and the market share held by foreign firms. Conditional 
on the acquisition not being challenged, the percentage of cash paid by the acquirer, the 
                                                 
29 The 1992 merger guidelines released jointly by the FTC and DOJ state that mergers in industries where 
the HHI is at least 0.18 and are expected to increase the HHI by at least 0.10 are more likely to be 
challenged. 
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Table V: Nested Logit Regression Estimates estimated by full information maximum likelihood. Regulated industry dummy is 1 if the relevant market is a 
regulated industry and zero otherwise. Relative size is the natural logarithm of the ratio of acquirer assets to target assets. Market share held by foreign firms is 
the market share held by firms not incorporated in the U.S operating in the relevant market. All other variables are as defined previously.  
Panel A Challenged Vs. unchallenged  
(Challenged =1; Unchallenged=0) 
Challenged & completed Vs. challenged & 
cancelled 
(Challenged & completed=1;  
Challenged & cancelled=0) 
Unchallenged & completed Vs. 
unchallenged & cancelled  
(Unchallenged & completed=1; 
unchallenged & cancelled=0) 
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Constant 
 
-5.8611a 
 
-5.9652a 
 
-5.9849 a 
      
 
Percentage change in HHI 
 
2.7620 a 
 
2.7403 a 
 
2.7221 a 
      
 
Acquirer size 
 
0.5372 a 
 
0.5429 a 
 
0.5532 a 
      
 
Regulated industry dummy 
 
0.1797 
 
0.1582 
 
 
      
 
Market share held by foreign firms 
 
-0.3319 
 
-0.2728 
 
-0.2998 
      
 
Acquirer industry 
 
-0.0020 
 
-0.0010 
 
-0.0010 
      
 
Target termination fees  
     
2.1178 a 
 
2.1201b 
  
2.0466 a 
 
2.0323 a 
 
Percentage cash paid 
    
0.0037 
  
0.0005 
 
0.0047 b 
  
0.0021 
 
Acquirer Tobin’s q 
    
0.3359a 
 
0.0997b 
 
0.0914c 
 
0.3399a 
 
0.1070b 
 
0.0997 b 
 
Target Tobin’s q 
    
-0.0104 
 
-0.0249 
 
-0.0230 
 
-0.1018 b 
 
-0.1215 a 
 
-0.1162 a 
 
Multiple bidders dummy 
    
-1.5503 a 
 
-1.7882 a 
 
-1.8198 a 
 
-1.3002 a 
 
-1.4438 a 
 
-1.5146 a 
 
Relative size 
    
0.1063 
 
-0.0731 
 
-0.0833 
 
0.7539a 
 
0.6187 a 
 
0.5945 a 
 
Inclusive value 
LR 
McFadden’s LRI 
 
1.0859 a 
1771.4 
0.5610 
 
1.0514 a 
1916.2 
0.6069 
 
1.0705 a 
1917 
0.6071 
      
a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
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Table V continued,  
Panel B Challenged Vs. unchallenged  
(Challenged =1; Unchallenged=0) 
Challenged & completed Vs. 
challenged & cancelled 
(Challenged & completed=1;  
Challenged & cancelled=0) 
Unchallenged & completed Vs. 
unchallenged & cancelled  
(Unchallenged & completed=1; 
unchallenged & cancelled=0) 
Explanatory variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Constant 
 
-5.8928 a 
 
-5.9121a 
    
 
Percentage change in HHI 
 
2.7848 a 
 
2.7505 a 
    
 
Acquirer size 
 
0.5381 a 
 
0.5573 a 
    
 
Acquirer industry 
 
-0.0015 
 
-0.0013 
    
 
Regulated industry dummy 
 
0.1737 
 
0.2328 
    
 
Market share held by foreign firms 
 
-0.3003 
 
-0.4088 
    
 
Target termination fees  
 
 
  
2.1270 a 
 
2.1533a 
 
2.0329 a 
 
1.9548 a 
 
Percentage cash paid 
   
0.0004 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0010 
 
Acquirer Tobin’s q 
   
0.0971c 
 
0.0710  
 
0.0963 b 
 
0.0845 b 
 
Target Tobin’s q 
   
-0.0248 
 
-0.0279 
 
-0.1175 a 
 
-0.1057 a 
 
Multiple bidders dummy 
   
-1.8132 a 
 
-1.8796 a 
 
-1.5126 a 
 
-1.5025 a 
 
Relative size 
   
-0.0870 
 
-0.0093 
 
0.5956 a  
 
0.5868 a 
 
Acquirer M/B 
   
-0.0055 
  
0.0016 
 
 
 
Target  M/B 
   
0.0027 
  
0.0005 
 
 
Acquirer leverage  
    
-2.3684 c 
  
-0.9433 
 
Target leverage 
    
1.6718 c 
  
1.5128 a 
Inclusive value 
LR 
McFadden’s LRI 
1.0426 a 
1918.7 
0.6077 
1.2937 b 
1925.4 
0.6098 
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acquirer’s investment opportunities, and relative size are positively related to the 
probability of completing the deal while the target firm’s investment opportunities and 
the existence of multiple bidders are negatively related to the probability of completing 
the deal. When the merger is challenged, the acquirer’s investment opportunities have a 
positive and significant impact on the probability of completing the deal while the 
existence of multiple bidders is significantly negatively related to the probability of 
completing the deal. In model 2, I replace the percentage of cash paid by a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the merger agreement includes target termination fees 
because the payment in cash and the inclusion of target termination fees could be used as 
substitutes for preventing competitive bidding. Including target termination fees is 
positively related to the probability of completing the deal for both the challenged and 
unchallenged deals. This result supports Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) 
empirical finding that target termination fees do increase the probability of completing an 
acquisition deal and here I document that this result holds even when the deal is 
challenged by the government. The acquirer investment opportunities and the relative 
size are still positively related to the probability of completing the deal and the existence 
of multiple bidders and target firm’s investment opportunities are still negatively related 
to the probability of completion for the unchallenged deals. For the challenged deals, the 
acquirer investment opportunities still significantly increases the probability of 
completing the deal while the existence of multiple bidders decreases it. When both the 
target termination fees and percentage of cash paid are included in model 3, the inclusion 
of target termination fees (but not the percentage of cash paid) is still positively related to 
the probability of completion regardless of whether the merger is challenged or not. In 
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model 4, I control for the acquirer and target firms’ M/B ratios and in Model 5, I control 
for acquirer and target leverage ratios. The results presented in the first three models do 
not change as a result of controlling for these variables for the unchallenged deals while 
for the challenged deals the acquirer’s investment opportunities lose significance when 
controlled for leverage ratios. 
 The parameters of inclusive values for all models are significantly different from 
1 and the McFadden’s LRI, which is one of the measures of the model’s explanatory 
power, ranges from 56.1% to 60.98%. 
 Although the above analysis shows that the target termination fees are positively 
related to the probability of completing an acquisition deal, it does not show whether this 
positive impact is due to the target termination fees being an efficient contracting device 
(efficiency hypothesis) or to their competition deterrence impact (managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis). In what follows, I perform several tests that investigate these 
two issues. 
 The efficiency hypothesis of target termination fees argues that termination fees 
are an efficient contracting device that benefits the target firm shareholders because by 
agreeing to pay termination fees the target manager induces the acquirer to reveal 
information that helps her to negotiate higher bid premium. Thus, the efficiency 
hypothesis implies that the existence of target termination fees is positively related to bid 
premium and does not discourage competitive bidding. The managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis argues that target manager who agrees to pay termination fees does so in order 
to lock his shareholders with acquiring firms that promise him job security. Thus, 
according to this hypothesis including target termination fees would make the target firm 
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more expensive to acquirer and consequently discourage competitive bidding. Thus, the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis implies that the existence of target termination fees 
is negatively related to the appearance of competitive bids and is not related to bid 
premium. 
a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
Table VI: OLS regression of the determinants of bid premium. The dependent variable is the bid premium. 
Target (Acquirer) TF is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for deals that include termination fees payable 
by the target (acquiring) firm and zero otherwise. Percentage cash is the cash percentage of the cash paid by 
the acquirer. Same industry is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the acquirer and target firms are in the 
same industry where the industry is defined as 4-digit SIC. Hostile is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
for deals classified by SDC as hostile and zero otherwise. Tender is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the acquisition is a tender offer and zero otherwise. Lockup is a dummy variable if the target gave the 
acquirer a lockup option and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a dummy variable if the target has a poison pill 
in place and zero otherwise. PreComp is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the target firm received 
takeover offer within six months prior to the acquisition announcement date and zero otherwise.  Log Tar  
(Aqc) MV is the  natural logarithm of the target (acquiring) firm market capitalization one day before the 
acquisition announcement day. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Model 4 
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0.864a 
 
0.842 a 
 
1.055 a 
 
0.798 a 
 
Target TF 
 
0.129a 
 
0.122 a 
 
0.110 
 
0.152 
 
Acquirer TF 
  
-0.033 
  
-0.024 
 
Percentage cash 
  
-0.001 b 
  
0.003 
 
Same industry 
  
0.033 
  
-0.052 
 
Hostile 
  
-0.007 
  
0.035 
 
Tender  
  
0.127 a 
  
-0.148 
 
Lockup 
  
-0.047 
  
0.105 
 
Poison pill 
  
-0.002 
  
 
PreComp 
  
-0.008 
  
-0.209 
 
Log Tar MV 
 
-0.049 a 
 
-0.048 a 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.028 
 
Log Aqc MV 
 
0.010 a 
 
0.012  
 
0.005 
 
0.011 
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Table VI shows OLS regression results for the determinants of the bid premium 
for challenged and challenged deals separately using both successful and unsuccessful 
deals. Model 1 shows that target termination fees are positively related to bid premium 
for the unchallenged deals while for the unchallenged deals no significant relation exists 
between target termination fees and bid premium. These results persist even after 
controlling for the existence of acquirer termination fees, type of the deal (tender offer or 
not), and the attitude by which the acquisition took place (hostile or friendly) as shown in 
models 2 and 4. Thus, target termination fess result in higher bid premium for targets 
only when the deal is not challenged.    
The regressions in Table VI include three variables (percentage cash, target 
termination fees, and lockup option) that can be related to competitive bidding. To 
investigate the competition deterrence role of these three variables, I perform a probit 
analysis of post announcement competition of a merger. The dependent variable in the 
probit analysis in Table VII is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a competitive 
bid is made within six months following the merger announcement date. Model 1 shows 
that including target termination fees is negatively related to the probability of observing 
a competitive bid following the announcement of an unchallenged merger. However, this 
may be due to the omitted variable bias. Therefore, I control for other variables that may 
be related to the appearance of a competitive bid especially the payment in cash and the 
lockup option in Model 2. After controlling for other variables, target termination fees are 
no longer related to the post announcement competition. In Models 3 and 4, I replicate 
the same analysis for the challenged deals controlling for the variables for which enough 
data is available. Model 3 shows that target termination fees do deter competitive bidding  
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a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
 
for challenged mergers as the inclusion of target termination fees in such mergers is 
significantly negatively related to receiving a competitive bid following the merger 
announcement and Model 4 shows that target termination fees continue playing 
competition deterrence role even after controlling for other relevant variables. 
Overall, the results indicate that the government’s antitrust policy plays a 
significant role in shaping the structure of markets for products and services by 
monitoring and preventing acquisition attempts that may result in giving few firms 
excessive control over production factors. The implementation of such policy is mainly 
Table VII: Probit regression of the determinants of the post announcement competition. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the target firm received a takeover offer within six 
months following the announcement of the acquisition and zero otherwise All other variables are as defined 
earlier. 
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0.489 
  
 
 
Log Tar MV 
 
-0.001 
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0.393 
 
0.664 
 
Log Aqc MV 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.840 
 
0.638 
 
0.838 
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based on predicting the post acquisition market concentration measured by the sales-
based HHI. No evidence is found here that mergers in regulated industries may be subject 
to heavier government scrutiny and no evidence that the government would allow U.S 
firms to complete an alleged anticompetitive acquisition transaction when non U.S firms 
hold a high market share in a particular industry.  
 The fact that not any acquisition deal is approved by the government, at least not 
before the merger parties agree to pursue the remedial action mandated by the 
government, is not irrelevant of merger-seeking firms’ decision to complete or cancel the 
deal. The results presented here show that merger parties as well as the deal 
characteristics of challenged deals are systematically different from those of 
unchallenged deals. In unchallenged mergers, targets are smaller than the acquirers and 
have lower investment opportunities and both of these factors significantly increase the 
probability of completing the deal while in challenged mergers, the relative size of the 
acquirer and target firms or the investment opportunities of the target firm has no impact 
on the probability of completing the deal. More importantly, the reason why the target 
firms would agree to paying termination fees if the deal falls through is different between 
challenged and unchallenged deals. In unchallenged deals, target termination fees result 
in higher bid premium for the target firm without deterring competitive bidding while in 
challenged deals target termination fees deter competitive bidding and do not result in 
higher bid premium.    
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10. Specification tests:  
 If the nested logit model is the appropriate specification for modeling the merger 
completion decision as in figure I, then the parameter estimates of the inclusive value (λ ) 
must lie in the unit interval. The λ  estimates in Table V are significantly different from 
zero but lie outside the unit interval. Hausman and McFadden (1984) argue that in this 
case, the probabilities are still well defined but the interpretation of the model as choice 
model is not clear cut. They further suggest that the reason behind λ  estimate taking a 
value outside the unit interval might be that the IIA property is satisfied in any sub branch 
of the tree. For the purpose of modeling merger completion decision, relaxing the IIA 
assumption across the branches and not within a branch is sufficient. To further 
investigate this issue, I test the IIA assumption using the likelihood ratio test and 
reestimate the parameters of the different models in Table V by conditional logit that 
assumes that the IIA property holds.     
The dependent variable in the conditional logit regressions in Table VII is a 4-
element choice variable (unchallenged and completed, unchallenged and cancelled, 
challenged and competed, and challenged and cancelled) and the independent variables 
are interacted with a dummy variable for the challenged and/or challenged and completed 
deals in order to allow for the firm specific effects across the different choices. The 
results from estimating model 1 in Table VII are qualitatively similar to those of model 1 
in Table V and the based on likelihood ratio test , the null hypothesis that the IIA 
assumption holds can be rejected. In untabulted results, I reestimate the conditional logit 
for all the models on Table V and find virtually similar results.  
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 a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table VIII: Conditional logit model estimates. The dependent variable is a choice variable that indicates 
whether the acquisition is challenged and completed, challenged and canceled, unchallenged and completed, 
or unchallenged and canceled.  Challenged and completed dummy is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the acquisition is challenged and completed and zero otherwise. Unchallenged and completed dummy is a 
dummy variable if the acquisition is unchallenged and completed. All other variables are as defined earlier 
except the challenged means that variables has been interacted with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the acquisition is challenged and zero otherwise. Challenged_completed means that the variables has been 
interacted with the challenged and completed dummy variable. Unchallenged_completed means that the 
variable has been interacted with the unchallenged and completed dummy variable.    
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                  Model 3 
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-6.0672 a 
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-0.0018 
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Challenged_ Market share held by foreign firms 
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0.5412 a 
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Challenged completed dummy 
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0.7793 b 
 
Challenged completed_target termination fees 
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Challenged_completed percentage cash 
 
-0.0052 
 
-0.0031 
 
Challenged_completed acquirer Tobin’s q 
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0.0499 
 
Challenged_completed target Tobin’s q 
 
-0.0204 
 
-0.0191 
 
Challenged_completed multiple bidders 
 
-1.9080 a 
 
-1.9306 a 
 
Challenged_completed relative size 
 
-0.1505 
 
-0.1782 
 
Unchallenged completed dummy 
 
1.3265 a 
 
0.3988 b 
 
Unchallenged_completed_target termination fees 
  
1.8807 a 
 
Unchallenged_completed percentage cash 
 
-0.0024 
 
-0.0031 
 
Unchallenged_completed acquirer Tobin’s q 
 
0.0981 b 
 
0.0603 
 
Unchallenged_completed target Tobin’s q 
 
-0.1186 a 
 
-0.1194 a 
 
Unchallenged_completed multiple bidders 
 
-1.6138 a 
 
-1.6069 a 
 
Unchallenged_completed relative size 
 
-0.5687 a 
 
0.5483 a 
 
LR 
McFadden’s LRI 
 
1828.4 a 
0.579 
 
1923.4 a 
0.6091 
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10. Conclusions: 
In this essay, I investigate the probability of completing an acquisition deal 
conditional on the government approval. Mergers that satisfy certain jurisdictional the 
merger parties to pursue a remedial action to restore competition as a condition for 
thresholds require notifying the FTC and can not be completed unless they are approved 
by the FTC, DOJ, or FCC which investigates the anticompetitive impact of the attempted 
merger. Mergers that are challenged by the government are either disapproved or require 
merger approval. 
 I model merger parties’ decision to complete or cancel an acquisition deal using 
the nested logit model because it allows the completion decision to be made as getting the 
regulatory approval on the first stage and then deciding to complete or cancel the deal on 
the second stage. Also, the nested logit model allows the completion decision to be 
affected by the existence of other choices. 
Consistent with evidence presented by Eckbo (1985), Coate et al (1990),  and 
Coate (2005), the expected change in market concentration measured by the HHI is 
significantly positively related to the probability that the government will challenge an 
acquisition deal. Mergers that are expected to result in a concentrated market are more 
likely to be challenged even if the market was fairly competitive before the attempted 
acquisition.  
Consistent with Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003), we find that 
including target termination fees in merger deals is significantly positively related to the 
probability of completing the deal whether it was challenged or not. However, we 
document that including target termination fees deters competitive bidding only if the 
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deal was challenged and leads to higher bid premium to the target firm only if the deal 
was not challenged. Conditional on not being challenged, acquirer’s investment 
opportunities and the relative size of acquirer and target firms are significantly positively 
related to the probability of completing the deal while target investment opportunities and 
the existence of multiple bidders are significantly negatively related to the probability of 
completing the deal. Finally, canceling an unchallenged merger attempt has more 
significant impact on target firm value. Targets of failed unchallenged merger attempts 
keep most of the value gains they had made at the merger announcement date while 
targets of failed challenged merger attempts lose most of it.  
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Essay 2 
 
The Divorce before a Merger: Value Consequences and Capital Allocation 
Efficiency of Merger Facilitating Asset Divestitures  
 
1. Introduction: 
 
 Extant empirical research shows that since the early 80s, U.S corporations have 
been witnessing a trend toward firm specialization or focus, reversing the multidivisional 
structure of U.S corporations that prevailed during the 60s and 70s. Comment and Jarrell 
(1995) attribute this trend toward corporate focus to firms’ inability to exploit the 
efficiencies that motivate diversification. In fact, Berger and Ofek (1995) show that 
diversified firms sell at a discount compared to single segment firms and argue that one 
reason for the discount is the inefficiency of investment policy of these firms. More 
specifically, they argue that diversified firms do not efficiently allocate funds to their 
divisions based on their divisional investment opportunities. Therefore, multisegment 
firms do not seem to have efficient internal capital markets that would allow a financially 
constrained division to undertake positive net present value investments.   
Consistent with the notion of inefficient internal capital markets in diversified 
firms, empirical research shows that firms that voluntarily divest assets that are not 
related to their core business, experience improved operating performance of the 
remaining assets (John and Ofek, 1995; Cusatis, Miles, and Wooldridge, 1993), higher 
stock returns (Comment and Jarrell, 1995), lower information asymmetries between 
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management and investors (Krishnaswami amd Subramaniam, 1999), more efficient 
investment policy (Ahn and Denis, 2004), and decrease in diversification discount 
(Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003) post divestiture . 
Whether to divest an asset or not and, given that the firm has decided to divest an 
asset, which asset to divest are decisions that the firm usually makes voluntarily. In some 
cases, however, divesting an asset is mandated by regulators if the firm is simultaneously 
involved in a merger attempt that is likely to increase market concentration in the relevant 
industry or if the firm had gained excessive market power over its life. From the 
regulatory point of view, an asset sale constitutes the most common remedial action that 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), or 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommends to prevent firms that acquire other firms 
from gaining monopolistic (or monoposonistic) power following the acquisition. The 
assets that the regulatory agency requires the acquirer to divest are those that overlap 
those of the acquired firm in case of horizontal acquisitions (acquisitions between 
competitors). In vertical acquisitions (acquisitions between firms in different industries), 
the federal government requires the acquirer to divest assets that are likely to enhance its 
buying power. In these cases, a firm would be giving up assets (or even a whole division) 
in order to facilitate its acquisition plans. Empirical research30 finds no evidence that 
acquisition attempts where the government required such kind of divestitures would have 
enhanced the acquirer’s monopolistic power, and little evidence that they would have 
increased acquirer’s buying power. This implies that merger facilitating assets 
divestitures may be costly to divesting firms.      
                                                 
30 See, for example, Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005), among others.  
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A merger facilitating asset divestiture31 need not be always formally mandated by 
the government. Johnson and Parkman (1991) find that after the passage of the HSR Act, 
merger regulations have become dramatically transparent eliminating much of the 
uncertainty as to whether the government would challenge an acquisition deal. An 
example that is consistent with this result is Texaco’s divestiture of some of its refining 
assets to ease its merger with Chevron. Such a divestiture was proposed upfront in order 
to preempt government challenge of the merger deal. Thus, another reason for asset 
divestitures is to satisfy a regulatory requirement. Unlike for voluntary asset divestitures, 
the literature does not clearly show whether merger facilitating sales are associated with 
changes in firm value and what, if any, do these divestitures cost the divesting firm.   
In this essay, I aim at contributing to the literature by investigating firm value 
changes around merger facilitating asset divestitures. More specifically, I compare 
between merger facilitating asset divestitures and other asset divestitures in terms of their 
announcement impacts and changes in divesting firm’s operating performance and focus.      
  
2. Literature Review:  
 In this section I present a brief review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
that directly relates to gains from asset divestitures and capital market efficiency changes 
around asset divestitures.   
2.1. Explanations for gains from asset divestitures: 
It is well documented in the literature that asset divestitures are positively 
associated with firm value. One explanation for the gain from asset divestitures is that the 
firm becomes more focused following the asset sale (John and Ofek, 1995; Comment and 
                                                 
31 For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the words ‘divestiture’ and ‘sale’ interchangeably. 
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Jarrell, 1995; Hite, Owers, and Rogers, 1987). According to this focus hypothesis, firms 
sell assets that do not fit into their business to buyers whose assets have similar 
characteristics to those assets being divested. Firms sell assets that interrupt the 
operations of other divisions and create negative synergies. The corporate focus 
hypothesis predicts that following the asset divestiture the firm will reduce investment in 
less efficient divisions and increase investment in more efficient divisions. John and Ofek 
(1995) find empirical evidence that the operating performance of asset sellers’ 
significantly improves following the divestiture.       
Another explanation for gains from asset divestitures, presented by Lang, 
Poulsen, and Stulz (1996), is the financing hypothesis. Lang et al. (1995) argue that firms 
that are financially constrained and cannot issue external securities due to information 
asymmetries find asset sales a less costly way to raise funds required to make new 
investments. The financing hypothesis implicitly assumes that management values firm 
size and control and, therefore, may not be willing to sell assets unless that was the last 
resort to raise funds for new projects. Using a sample of asset sales that management 
deems significant and unexpected, Lang et al. (1995) find that sellers who payout the 
cash proceeds from asset sales are poor performers and have less investment 
opportunities than sellers who retain the proceeds. Bates (2005) provides recent evidence 
consistent with this result. Specifically, he finds that the probability of retaining sale 
proceeds is positively related to firm’s investment opportunities. However, retaining 
firms invest significantly more than their industry benchmarks. Therefore, although firms 
with more investment opportunities are more likely to retain sale proceeds, the existence 
of agency considerations cannot be ruled out.              
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Schlingmann, Stulz, Walkling (2002) present evidence consistent with both the 
focusing and the financing explanations for divestitures. However, they show that firms 
that refocus their operations by decreasing the number of their reported segments do not 
necessarily do so by divesting the segment that the firm stopped reporting. Some firms 
actually divest a segment while others restructure the segment internally. Schilngmann et 
al. (2002) show that firm asset liquidity can explain why some focusing firms actually 
divest an asset while others do not. They find that firms that have more liquid assets are 
more likely to divest and given that a firm is divesting a segment, more liquid assets are 
more likely to be divested. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) also find supporting evidence 
for focusing and financing hypotheses and further document that the diversification 
discount deceases following the asset divestiture.      
 
 2.2. Efficiency of internal capital allocation: 
 Proponents of the efficient internal capital market theory argue that the 
multidivisional structure of diversified firms relaxes the external financing constraints 
that arise as a result of information asymmetries between the firm and its capital 
suppliers. Because resources could be transferred among divisions of a diversified firm, 
these firms can finance positive NPV projects that would be forgone had the firm been a 
focused single division firm. Consistent with this argument, Lamont (1997) finds that oil 
companies reduced investment in non-oil divisions when the oil prices rose at the 
beginning of the 80s, an observation that points at the interdependence among the 
different divisions of a multidivisional firm.  
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Stein (1997) theoretically models the circumstances under which an internal 
capital market can function efficiently in a credit constrained firm whose headquarters 
has the incentive to engage in winner-picking (because it can better assess the relative 
merits of the firm’s divisions). He argues that diversification enhances the efficiency of 
the internal capital market because it increases the resources available to headquarters 
and prevents mistakes made about a project’s outcomes from affecting assessments of 
other projects. A focused corporate structure would work better if there are errors in 
assessing projects and those errors are correlated. 
The classical internal capital markets theory assumes that the incentives of the 
headquarters and divisional managers are aligned. If this is not the case, then, divisional 
managers will act to extract rents from the headquarters. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) 
model a setting that assumes such behavior and show that divisional managers may 
extract greater compensation not in higher cash wages but rather in preferential capital 
budget allocations. This leads to cross subsidization among divisions, which, in turn, 
results in the resources being drained away from divisions with good investment 
opportunities to divisions with poor investment opportunities. Therefore, contrary to the 
predictions of the efficient capital markets theory, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) predict 
that diversified firms will have an inefficient capital market.  
Another reason for the possibility that the internal markets may not work 
efficiently is presented by Rajan, Serveas, and Zingales (2000). They present a model 
where the divisional manager can choose between two investments, one efficient and the 
other is not, and show that as diversity between the resource-weighted investment 
opportunities (not relative investment opportunities) of firm’s divisions increases, 
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divisional managers have less incentive to choose the efficient investment. Headquarters 
that understand this will try to induce divisional managers to choose the efficient 
investment by giving them control over more resources. According to the Rajan et al. 
(2000) model’s predictions, this will lead to resources being transferred from divisions 
with high resource-weighted investment opportunities to divisions with low-resource 
weighted investment opportunities. The model also relates the value of the firm to the 
degree of its diversification and implies that there is a level of diversification where the 
value of the firm peaks and then starts to decrease. Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) also 
present a model that shows that a firm’s optimal level of focus in operations is  a trade off 
between the transaction costs of raising external financing and the cost of overinvestment 
as the firm diversifies.  
  
2.3. Empirical evidence on the efficiency of internal capital allocation: 
 The earliest evidence on the inefficiency of internal capital markets is presented 
by Berger and Ofek (1995) who show that multidivisional (diversified) firms trade at a 
discount while single division (focused) firms trade at a premium relative to the sum of 
their parts. They show that diversified firms invest more in divisions with low investment 
opportunities than in divisions with high investment opportunities. More recent empirical 
research finds mixed evidence on the efficiency of internal capital markets in diversified 
firms. For example, Shin and Stulz (1998) find that in highly diversified firms, segment 
investment is less sensitive to its cash flow than for comparable single segment firms and 
that segment investment increases with its investment opportunities but is not related to 
other segments’ investment opportunities. Billet and Mauer (2003) relate the efficiency of 
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internal capital markets to firm’s value and find that efficient subsidies to financially 
constrained segments increase firm value while inefficient subsidies to unconstrained 
segments do not affect firm value. This result is consistent with the internal capital 
markets being efficient.  
 Another line of empirical research tests changes in internal capital market 
efficiency around corporate divestitures. This strand of literature unanimously shows that 
asset divestitures are related to improvements in diversified firm’s investment policy but 
finds mixed results when testing internal capital market efficiency around these 
divestitures. Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002) find that firms that spin-off an 
unrelated division experience increased sensitivity of investment to investment 
opportunities. By reconstructing the parent firm after spinoff, Burch and Nanda (2003) 
find that firm value improvement following the spinoff is related to decreases in diversity 
and not solely a result of selection bias or measurement errors. Finally, Ahn and Denis 
(2004) more directly link the inefficiency of investment with the incidence of spin off 
event. They find that following a spin off firm’s value increases due improvement in 
investment efficiency.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development: 
 In this section, I present hypotheses that investigate the difference between 
merger facilitating asset divestitures and other divestitures. In addition, I compare the 
efficiency of internal capital allocation prior to both of these asset divestitures. 
 
 
 63
  3.1. Market reaction to merger facilitating asset divestitures: 
 Figure II below shows the sequences of event dates in a challenged acquisition 
deal. The length of the time period that elapses between the acquisition announcement 
date and the announcement of merger facilitating divestiture depends on how fast the 
merger parties and the FTC, FCC, or DOJ officials agree on the assets to be divested.  
 
 Figure II: The sequence of event dates in a challenged acquisition deal. 
 
 
Acquisition announcement          Merger facilitating divestiture            Acquisition completion 
                 date                   announcement date                 or cancellation date 
 
The announcement of an acquisition usually precedes the announcement of 
regulatory mandated asset sale. Here, a question may be raised as to whether the market 
reaction to the merger announcement reflects the impending possibility of the asset sale 
for acquisitions that are likely to enhance acquirer’s monopolistic (or monopsonistic) 
power. The announcement impacts of these two events are assumed to be independent 
although if investors were able to anticipate government decision as to whether it would 
challenge the acquisition, then, that anticipated reaction is likely to feed back in the 
acquisition announcement impact. Therefore, to the extent that this assumption holds, the 
announcement impact of the acquisition announcement will reflect the expected true 
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value change of the acquirer. A similar argument also applies for the announcement 
impacts of the acquisition and its completion or cancellation.32   
Empirical research documents a positive market reaction to the announcement of 
voluntary corporate asset sell offs.33 Hite et al. (1987) explain this positive reaction as 
evidence that asset sell offs are movements of resources to those who can use them more 
efficiently. Such argument implies that asset sellers sell those assets that fit more into the 
buyers business than into their own business. John and Ofek (1995) provide consistent 
evidence with this argument. Lang, Poulsen, Stulz (1995) show that the market reaction 
depends on the purpose for which the proceeds from the sale are going to be used. They 
find that when the management announces that the proceeds will be used for debt 
retirement or as dividends then an asset sale is good news while if it is announced that the 
proceeds will be retained in the firm then the market reaction becomes negative. 
 The assets that are divested in order to facilitate a merger are chosen by the 
regulatory agency and are usually assets from the division whose assets overlap those of 
the target firm. For example, in Tribune Co.’s acquisition of Renaissance Communication 
Corp., the FCC required Tribune to divest its WDZL-TV because FCC rules prohibit 
ownership of two or more TV stations whose signals overlap.34 Another example is 
Albertson’s Inc., which had to divest its stores that overlapped with those of American 
Stores Co. Such divestitures represent a loss of revenue which may not be easy to recover 
at least within a short period of time. In fact, Albertson’s was expected to lose 6% of the 
                                                 
32 The empirical research that tests the informativeness of the announcement market reaction finds mixed 
results. See, for example, Luo (2005) and Jennings and Mazzeo (1993).  
33 See, for example, Alexander, Benson, Kampmeyer (1984); Hite, Owers, Rogers (1987); Comment and 
Jarrell (1995); Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) 
34 See the Wall Street Journal edition on July 1, 1996. 
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combined company’s sales due to this divestiture.35 Therefore, a merger facilitating 
divestiture is likely to be perceived by the market as bad news. Thus, I hypothesize that,     
  
H1: The announcement of a merger facilitating asset sale will have a negative or less 
positive market reaction than that of non merger related asset sale.   
  
3.2. Relatedness of assets divested in a merger facilitating divestiture to the 
acquirer’s remaining business lines and the acquirer’s operating 
performance following the asset sale: 
 Recent empirical literature documents an increasing trend toward corporate focus. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) find that diversified firms trade at discount while single segment 
firms trade at premium. Consistent with this result, Comment and Jarrell (1995) show 
that increase in focus is positively related to firm stock performance. John and Ofek 
(1996) show that increase in focus is also positively related to the operating performance 
of firm’s remaining assets because it eliminates the negative synergies between the 
divested assets and seller’s remaining assets. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) further show 
that diversified firms that divest a segment experience increase in their value.  
 A regulatory mandated divestiture is a divestiture that would prevent the acquirer 
from having a monopolistic power following the acquisition. Increasing monopolistic 
power would be a concern when a firm acquires one of its competitors whose core 
business is the same as that of the acquiring firm. Therefore, when required to divest 
                                                 
35 See the Wall Street Journal edition on June 22, 1999. 
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assets, the acquirer will have to divest assets that overlap those of the target firm. Thus, I 
hypothesize that,   
 
H2: Firms that sell assets for non merger related reasons will experience increase in 
focus while firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger will experience no change or 
even a decrease in focus. 
 
 In the absence of agency problem that results from the information asymmetry 
between managers and stockholders, the focus hypothesis predicts that the operating 
performance of firms that sell assets that result in the firm becoming focused will 
increase. Since a merger facilitating asset sale is not driven by firm’s willingness to 
become more focused, the focus hypothesis would predict that firms that sell related (for 
example, merger-facilitating) assets to have better operating performance than that of 
firms that sell related assets. Thus, according to the focus hypothesis,  
 
H3: Firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger attempt have better operating 
performance prior to the sale than that of firms that sell assets for non-merger 
related reasons.  
 
 3.3. Internal Capital allocation efficiency: 
 Assuming that headquarters and divisional mangers’ interests are aligned, the 
classical internal capital market theory predicts that as firm’s diversity decreases the 
internal capital market will function less efficiently. In other words, divisions that have 
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high investment opportunities will become less able to finance new projects. In contrast, 
Scharfestein and Stein (2000) model makes the opposite prediction assuming that 
headquarters and divisional mangers’ interests are not aligned. Rajan et al. argue that 
divisional investment opportunities should be compared relative to the resources 
available to them (i.e. not in absolute terms) because the headquarters will induce the 
divisional mangers to choose efficient investment by granting them enough resources to 
do so. They predict that the higher are the division’s relative investment opportunities, 
the less will the firm invest in that division, and vice versa. Thus, according to these three 
theories, if asset divestitures are driven by inefficient internal capital market, firms that 
sell an asset only for the purpose of facilitating an acquisition should have efficient 
internal capital market before the actual sale of the asset compared to that of firms that 
sell for non regulatory reasons. Therefore, I hypothesize that     
 
H4: Before the asset sale, firms that sell assets to facilitate an acquisition deal have more 
efficient internal capital market than that of firms that sell assets voluntarily.   
 
4. Variables Definitions: 
An asset sale is defined as merger-facilitating if the firm is selling the asset in 
order to satisfy a regulatory requirement for approving an acquisition attempt that it is 
involved in at the same time. 
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4.1. Corporate Focus:  
To measure corporate focus, I use the following measures. First, the number of 
SIC codes reported by COMPUSTAT. Second, whether or not the divested division is 
related to the seller’s core business. An asset sale is classified as related if the 3-digit SIC 
code of the assets or the segment to which the sold assets belong is the same as that of the 
segment that has the highest sales. Third, sales-based Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI). 
The HHI is calculated as,  
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where Si is firm’s segment i’s sales or assets.  
 
4.2. Operating performance: 
 As in John and Ofek (1995), I measure firm’s operating performance as (1) 
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to sales and (2) earnings before interest, 
taxes, and depreciation to book value of assets.  
  
4.3. Internal capital market efficiency: 
To measure the internal capital market efficiency, I use Rajan et al. (2000) 
measures of funds transferred to/from a segment and the relative value added by 
allocation.  
Rajan et al. (2000) proxy for the transfers the segment makes (if negative) or 
receives (if positive) is computed as,  
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where ss refers to single-segment firms, wj is segment j’s share of total firm 
assets. q is the asset-weighted average of segment qs for the firm, qj is the asset-weighted 
Q ratio of single segment firms that operate exclusively in segment j, Ij is the capital 
expenditure of segment j, BAj is the book value of assets of segment j, 
j
j
I
BA
 is the asset-
weighted average capital expenditures to assets ratio for the single segment firms in the 
corresponding industry where the industry is defined at the 3-digit level of the segment 
SIC, and BA in the firm’s book value of assets.  
 
5. Methodology:  
The market reaction to the announcement of asset sales will be tested using the 
standard event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) with the CRSP value 
weighted portfolio as proxy for the market portfolio. To test for the operating 
performance and focus level changes, I use parametric and non parametric tests. I also 
use the ordinary least regressions to relate the changes in operating performance to the 
change in a firm’s focus level. .  
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6. Data and sample: 
 The initial sample of asset divestitures36 is obtained from the Securities Database 
Corporation (SDC) over the period 1990-2002. The SDC database includes divestitures 
of assets and divestitures of a whole subsidiary. When a firm sells an asset, the SDC 
records the name of the divesting firm as the parent firm and the type of the assets 
divested as the name of the target. Therefore, I treat the target parent firm rather than the 
target firm as the asset divesting firm. I exclude spin off and equity carve-out transactions 
and transactions where the asset divesting parent firm is not U.S public firm or is 
operating in the financial industry (SIC 6000-6999). To verify the incidence of the asset 
sale transaction, its announcement date, and reason for the sale, I search the transactions 
in Newswires compiled in Lexis-Nexis.37 Finally, to be in the sample, the selling firms 
must have data on the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. The final sample consists of 
1240 asset and subsidiary sale transactions including 51 merger facilitating sales where 
the transaction value is $10 million or more and the reason for selling the asset is 
disclosed in 477 asset sale announcements. Other disclosed reasons for the sale include: 
increasing firm’s focus, reducing debt, selling non core or non strategic assets, among 
other reasons.  
 Panel A of Table I shows the distribution of asset sales over the sample period 
1990-2002 classified into merger-facilitating and non merger-related asset sales. The 
number of asset sales increases steadily until 1998, a pattern that is consistent with the 
documented restructuring activity that U.S corporations went through during the 1990s.  
                                                 
36 The SDC identifies the transaction as divestiture if the target firm loses controlling stake in the divested 
entity following the transaction. 
37 For this search, I use the asset selling firms name, the buyer’s name, FTC, FCC, and DOJ, as search 
terms. 
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Table I: Panel A shows the distribution of 1240 non-merger related and merger related asset sales over the 
period 1990-2002. The initial sample of asset divestitures is obtained from the Securities Database 
Corporation (SDC). The purpose of the asset sales is identified by searching the newswires compiled in 
Lexis-Nexis. Panel B shows the distribution of the asset sales across industries where the industry defined 
on the 2-digit SIC code.    
Panel A: Distribution over the sample period.  
 
Year 
 
All asset sales 
 
Non-merger related 
 
Merger-facilitating 
 
1990 
 
52 
 
51 
 
1 
 
1991 
 
33 
 
33 
 
0 
 
1992 
 
53 
 
53 
 
0 
 
1993 
 
59 
 
58 
 
1 
 
1994 
 
62 
 
60 
 
2 
 
1995 
 
91 
 
85 
 
6 
 
1996 
 
123 
 
116 
 
7 
 
1997 
 
123 
 
122 
 
1 
 
1998 
 
163 
 
157 
 
6 
 
1999 
 
126 
 
115 
 
11 
 
2000 
 
128 
 
114 
 
14 
 
2001 
 
110 
 
109 
 
1 
 
2002 
 
117 
 
116 
 
1 
 
Total 
 
1240 
 
1189 
 
51 
Panel B: Distribution across industries. 
 
Industry Name (2-digit SIC) 
 
All asset sales 
 
Non-merger related 
 
Merger-facilitating 
 
Mining (10-14) 
 
101 
 
98 
 
3 
 
Construction (15-17) 
 
4 
 
4 
 
0 
 
Manufacturing (20-39) 
 
610 
 
589 
 
21 
 
Transportation & public utilities (40-49) 
 
232 
 
212 
 
20 
 
Wholesale trade (50-51) 
 
39 
 
39 
 
0 
 
Retail trade (52-59) 
 
55 
 
50 
 
5 
 
Services (70-89) 
 
190 
 
188 
 
2 
 
Other (99) 
 
9 
 
9 
 
0 
 
Total 
 
1240 
 
1189 
 
51 
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As similar patter is also seen in the government involvement as more and more firms 
divest assets for regulatory reasons. Panel B shows the distribution of the asset sales 
across the different industries. Most of both non merger related and merger facilitating 
asset sales take place in the manufacturing and transportation and public utilities 
industries and no assets are exchanged in the construction and wholesale trade industries 
to facilitate a merger transaction.  
 
7. Market reaction results:  
Table II shows the market reaction to the announcement of an asset sale for both 
merger-facilitating and non merger-related reasons over different event windows. Upon 
the announcement of non merger-related asset sale, the stock price of the seller 
significantly increases by 2.06% compared to no significant reaction for firms selling 
assets to facilitate an acquisition transaction. The announcement day return documented 
in the literature ranges from 0.014% to 1.66%.38 Over 4 day period (two days before to 
two days after) around the announcement date, firms selling assets to facilitate a merger 
lose 1.84% of their value while firms selling assets for non merger related reasons gain 
2.79%. Thus, announcement of selling asset to facilitate a merger is unfavorable news to 
investors while selling an asset for non merger-related reasons is greeted as good news. 
For merger facilitating asset sales, the announcement of an acquisition attempt is usually 
separate from the announcement of the asset sale and therefore the announcement 
reaction of the asset sales is not contaminated by the announcement impact of the 
acquisition attempt. However, if the acquisition attempt is challenged by the government, 
                                                 
38 See John and Ofek, 1995, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995, and Hite, Owers, and Rogers, 1987, among 
others. 
 73
investors may expect the announcement of the asset sale. Thus, to the extent that 
investors are able to anticipate the asset sale, the announcement reaction of that sale 
understates the true market reaction.  
Table II: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement of non merger-related and merger-
facilitating. CAR is calculated using the standard event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) 
where the value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms is used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The 
market model parameters are estimated using returns of 155 days ending 45 days before the date of 
announcement.    
 
 
 
Non-merger related 
 
 
Merger-facilitating 
Event window Mean(%) Median(%) Mean(%) Median(%) 
 
(-1,0) 
 
2.06a 
 
0.56 a 
 
0.41 
 
-0.58 
 
(-5,0) 
 
2.84a 
 
1.03 a 
 
-1.97a 
 
-1.52c 
 
(-5,5) 
 
2.75 a 
 
1.19 a 
 
-3.71a 
 
-1.81b 
 
(-2,2) 
 
2.79 a 
 
1.27 a 
 
-1.84b 
 
-1.709 b 
a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
8. Descriptive statistics: 
 Panel A of table III shows the descriptive statistics for asset sellers at the end of 
the fiscal year preceding the asset sale. Firms that are selling assets to facilitate an 
acquisition transaction have significantly higher total assets, sales, and intangible assets 
than those of firms selling assets for non merger related reasons. Firms that are selling 
assets to facilitate a merger have significantly higher investment opportunities compared 
to their industry peers and compared to firms that are selling assets for non merger related 
reasons as their Tobin’s q (0.1640) is significantly higher than zero and significantly 
higher than that of firms that are selling assets for non merger related reasons. One reason 
cited in the financial press for undertaking an asset is the need for financing when the 
firm has low internally generated funds or has high debt in its capital structure. This may  
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Table III: Panel A shows the summary statistics for asset selling firms calculated at the end of the year 
preceding the year of the asset sale announcement date. Panel B shows measures of information 
asymmetry, operating performance, focus, and internal capital market efficiency calculated at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the announcement date. Free cash flow (FCF) is calculated as operating income 
before depreciation – interest expense – income taxes – capital expenditures. Leverage is calculated as 
(long term debt + current portion of long term debt) / (total assets + book value of equity + market value of 
common equity). Market value of common equity is calculated as the product of number of shares 
outstanding and the fiscal year closing stock price. Tobin’s q is calculated as (market value of common 
equity – book value of equity + total assets)/(total assets). MV assets is the market value of assets and is 
calculated as the market value of equity + book of debt. PPE is the plant, property, and equipment. EBITD 
is the earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation. ROA is the return of assets and is calculated as net 
income/book value of assets. The Tobin’s q, Leverage, EBITD/Sales, ROA, and EBITD/MV of assets are 
adjusted for industry by subtracting the industry median value where the industry is defined as the 4 digit 
SIC code provided that there are at least three firms in the industry, otherwise the industry is the defined as 
the 3 digit SIC code. Residual standard deviation in year t is the standard deviation of the residuals of the 
market model regression using the daily returns from year t-1. HHI is the Herfindahl Hirschman index 
calculated using segment sales. RVA is the Rajan et al. (2000) measure of relative value added by 
allocation and is calculated as 
( )
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where ss refers to single-segment firms, wj is segment j’s share of total firm assets. q is the asset-weighted 
average of segment qs for the firm, qj is the asset-weighted Q ratio of single segment firms that operate 
exclusively in segment j, Ij is the capital expenditure of segment j, BAj is the book value of assets of 
segment j, j
j
I
BA
 is the asset-weighted average capital expenditures to assets ratio for the single segment 
firms in the corresponding industry where the industry is defined at the 3-digit level of the segment SIC, 
and BA in the firm’s book value of assets. Dollar amounts are denominated in millions. The median tests 
are performed using the Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
 
 
Panel A:  summary statistics for asset selling firms calculated at the end of the year preceding the year 
of the asset sale announcement date. 
 Non-merger related 
 
Merger-facilitating 
 Mean Median Mean  Median 
 
p-value for the 
median difference 
 
Assets 
 
8744.09 
 
1879.02 
 
17125.32 
 
11065.90 
 
0.000 
 
Sales 
 
6536.84 
 
1568.97 
 
13516.38 
 
3146.00 
 
0.002 
  
Intangibles/Total assets 
 
0.1453 
 
0.0696 
 
0.2685 
 
0.1927 
 
0.000 
 
PPE/Total assets 
 
0.3754 
 
0.3252 
 
0.3728 
 
0.2826 
 
0.415 
 
R&D expenses/sales 
 
0.0705 
 
0.0249 
 
0.1709 
 
0.0194 
 
0.683 
 
FCF/assets 
 
-0.0072 
 
0.0137 
 
-0.0884 
 
0.0233 
 
0.085 
 
Tobin’s q 
 
0.0400 
 
-0.0280 a 
 
1.2965 a 
 
0.1640 a 
 
0.020 
 
Leverage 
 
0.0788 a 
 
0.0430 a 
 
0.0025 
 
-0.0080 
 
0.019 
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a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
be a reason for the significantly high leverage ratio of firms selling assets for non merger 
related reasons compared to their industry peers and compared to firms that are selling 
assets to facilitate a merger transaction.      
 
 Panel B of table III shows measures of information asymmetry, operating 
performance, focus, and internal capital market efficiency of asset selling firms. The 
operating performance, measured by EBITD/sales or ROA, of asset selling firms is not 
different from that of their industry peers irrespective of the announced reason for the 
asset sale. Furthermore, the operating performance of firms selling assets to facilitate a 
merger is not different from that of firms selling assets for non merger related reasons. 
However, asset selling firms have significantly higher information asymmetry than their 
industry peers regardless of the announced reason for the asset sale. The HHI is 
Panel B: Measures of information asymmetry, operating performance, focus, and internal capital market 
efficiency.  
 Non-merger related 
 
Merger-facilitating 
 Mean Median Mean  Median 
 
p-value for the 
median difference 
 
Residual Standard deviation 
 
0.0298 a 
 
0.0242 a 
 
0.0226 a 
 
0.0204 a 
 
0.435 
 
EBITD/Sales 
 
0.0102 
 
0.0042 
 
-0.0774 
 
0.0136 
 
0.626 
 
ROA 
 
0.0075 
 
0.0014 
 
-0.0681 
 
0.0005 
 
0.530 
 
EBITD/MV of assets 
 
-0.0108 
 
0.0064 b 
 
-0.0067 
 
-0.0144 
 
0.600 
 
Number of segments 
reported 
 
2.82 
 
3.00 
 
3.19 
 
2.00 
 
0.176 
 
HHI 
 
0.6834 
 
06594 
 
0.6341 
 
0.5111 
 
0.203 
 
RVA 
 
0.0040c 
 
0.00 
 
-0.0089a 
 
-0.0046a 
 
0.00 
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calculated using segment sales and, therefore, it can only be calculated for firms that have 
segment data. As a result, the sample reduces to 1153 asset sales including 42 merger 
facilitating asset sales. The relative value added by allocation (RVA) in Table III is the 
Rajan et al. (2000) measure of internal capital market efficiency which can only be 
calculated for diversified firms that report multiple segments. Due to this restriction the 
RVA is calculated in 766 asset sales including 29 merger facilitating asset sales. Firms 
selling assets to facilitate a merger are not different from firms selling for other reasons in 
terms of their focus level whether it is measured by the number of segments reported or 
their HHI calculated using segment sales. Finally, firms that sell assets to facilitate a 
merger have significantly less efficient internal capital market than that of firms selling 
assets for non merger related reasons.   
 
9. Results:  
 9.2. Operating Performance Changes following an Asset Sale:  
 The pair wise comparisons of operating performance and focus in Table III do 
not show whether the improvement in operating performance or increase in focus level 
may have been a motive for selling an asset. Therefore, I examine the change in operating 
performance and focus level from the year before to the year after the asset sale. Panel A 
of Table IV shows that the operating performance of firms that sell assets for non merger 
related reasons significantly increases regardless of how the operating performance is 
measured while firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger do not experience any change 
in operating performance following the asset sale as shown in panel B of Table III. Also, 
firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger experience significant decrease in focus as the 
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number of segments that those firms report after the asset sale increases from 2 to 4 and 
their HHI decreases from 0.5111 to 0.5015 and both of these changes are significant at 
the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. Thus, as a result of the asset sale, firms that sell 
Table IV: Panel A shows measures of operating performance and focus for firms that sell assets for non 
merger-related reasons in the year preceding and following the asset sale announcement and the mean and 
median change tests from the year before to the year after the asset sale. Panel B shows measures of 
operating performance for firms that sell assets for merger facilitating reason and the mean and median 
change tests from the year before to the year after the asset sale. All the variables are as defined previously 
and dollar amounts are denominated in millions 
Panel A: Non merger-related asset sales 
 
Variable 
 
One year before 
event 
 
 
One year after event 
 
p-value for 
difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Residual standard deviation 
 
Measures of operating 
performance: 
 
0.0301 
 
0.0245 
 
0.0320 
 
0.0243 
 
0.00 
 
0.009 
 
EBITD/sales 
 
0.0097 
 
0.0041 
 
0.0236 
 
0.0154 
 
0.172 
 
0.012 
 
ROA 
 
0.0078 
 
0.0007 
 
0.0154 
 
0.0100 
 
0.143 
 
0.053 
 
EBITD/ MV of assets 
 
-0.0120 
 
0.0066 
 
-0.1094 
 
0.0083 
 
0.343 
 
0.046 
 
Measures of focus: 
 
 
  
 
   
 
Number of segments reported 
 
2.84 
 
3.00 
 
3.00 
 
3.00 
 
0.001 
 
0.927 
 
Segment-based HHI 
 
 
0.6814 
 
0.6577 
 
0.6875 
 
0.6596 
 
0.234 
 
0.001 
Panel B: Merger facilitating asset sales 
 
Residual standard deviation 
 
Measures of operating 
performance: 
 
0.0224 
 
0.0227 
 
0.0301 
 
0.0249 
 
0.010 
 
0.004 
 
EBITD/sales 
 
0.0431 
 
0.333 
 
0.0310 
 
0.0054 
 
0.487 
 
0.464 
 
ROA 
 
0.243 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0143 
 
-0.0031 
 
0.363 
 
0.279 
 
EBITD/ MV of assets 
 
0.0008 
 
0.0037 
 
0.0095 
 
0.0019 
 
0.268 
 
0.561 
 
Measures of focus: 
 
 
     
 
Number of segments reported 
 
3.19 
 
2.00 
 
3.92 
 
4.00 
 
0.004 
 
0.005 
 
Segment-based HHI 
 
0.6341 
 
0.5111 
 
0.5992 
 
0.5015 
 
0.068 
 
0.096 
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assets to facilitate a merger become more diversified while firm that sell assets for other 
reasons become more focused.  
 Next, I investigate the relationship between the change in operating 
performance and the change in focus following an asset sale. Prior research shows that 
firms that sell assets that are not related to their core business experience improved 
operating performance of the remaining assets following the asset sale. The dependent  
Table V: OLS regression of the determinants of change in operating performance following an asset sale. 
The dependent variable is EBITD/sales. Change in HHI is the difference between HHI in the year before 
the asset sale and HHI in the year after the asset sale. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets. Industry dummy is a dummy variable that indicates the firm’s 2-digit primary SIC code. Merger 
facilitating dummy is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the announced reason for the asset sale is to 
facilitate a merger. Merger_HHI is the interaction term of the merger facilitating asset and the change in 
HHI. Log MV is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value one day before the asset sale 
announcement day. After 1997 dummy is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the asset sale is announced 
after the end 1997. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Variable  
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Constant 
 
0.200 b 
 
0.200 b 
 
0.198 b 
 
0.194 a 
 
Change in HHI 
 
0.146 b 
 
0.145 b 
 
0.151 b 
 
0.150 b 
 
Firm size 
 
-0.014  
 
-0.014  
 
-0.016  
 
-0.016  
 
Industry dummy 
 
-0.001 c 
 
-0.001 c 
 
-0.001 c 
 
-0.001 c 
 
Log MV 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
Merger facilitating dummy 
  
-0.013 
 
 
 
-0.021 
 
Merger_HHI 
  
0.025 
  
0.027 
 
After 1997 dummy 
   
0.029 
 
0.029 
a Significant at 1% level.  
b Significant at 5% level. 
c Significant at 10% level. 
 
variable in Table V is the change in operating performance measured by EBITD/sales. 
Model 1 shows that increase in focus is significantly positively related to the change in 
operating performance controlling for the firm’s size and industry. In model 2, I test 
whether the relationship between change in focus and change in operating performance is 
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different between firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger and firms that sell assets for 
other reasons by including a dummy variable for asset sales that are undertaken to 
facilitate a merger and an interaction term with the change in focus. Both of these 
variables are not significant indicating that the positive relationship between change in 
focus and change on operating performance holds regardless of the announced reason for 
the asset sale. Since the HHI is calculated using segment sales and because of the change 
in accounting requirements for reporting segment data, I control for this change in models 
3 and 4. The results in Models 3 and 4 show that the change in reporting requirements 
does not change the positive relation between change in operating performance and 
change in focus.  
 Overall, the results indicate that firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger have 
high growth opportunities and do not seem to be financially constrained compared to 
their industry peers. Although these firms are as diversified as the firms that sell assets 
for other reasons, increase in focus does not represent a motive for them to sell assets as 
these firms become more diversified following the asset sale. However, no evidence in 
found here to indicate that the positive relationship between operating performance and 
change in focus does not hold for firm that sell assets to facilitate a merger.  
 
10. Conclusion:  
 In this essay, I compare between firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger and 
firms that sell assets for other reasons in term of their and firm focus level changes. 
Merger facilitating asset are those undertaken in order to satisfy a regulatory condition 
for approving an acquisition transaction that the firm is involved in at the same time.  
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 For a sample of 1250 asset sales obtained from the SDC, I study the value 
consequences of asset sales that took place during the period 1990-2002 as well as the 
selling firm’s operating and focus levels.  
 The results show that firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger are significantly 
larger and have higher sales than those of firms that sell assets for other reasons. They 
also have significantly higher growth opportunities and lower leverage ratio. The 
announcement of an asset sale to facilitate a merger is perceived as bad news while 
selling an asset for other reason is greeted as good news by investors.  
 Consistent with the evidence presented by John and Ofek (1995), Comment and 
Jarrell (1995), and more recently, Bates (2005), I find that firms that sell assets for non 
merger related reasons experience increase in focus and improved operating performance 
following the asset sale. Furthermore, the change in focus is positively related to the 
change in operating performance. In contrast, firms that sell assets to facilitate a merger 
become more diversified and do not show any change on operating performance 
following the asset sale. However, the positive relationship between the change in focus 
and the change in operating performance is not different between firma that sell assets to 
facilitate a merger and firms that sell assets for other reasons.  
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Appendix: Brief description of the challenged acquisition deals.  
 In this appendix, I provide brief details about the challenged acquisitions. These details are 
collected from the FTC website, Lexis-Nexis, and the Wall street Journal.  
 Format of challenged acquisitions’ information. 
Announcement date.  
Acquiring and target firms’ names. 
Challenging agency. 
Remedial action required for competed deals or reason for canceling the deal for cancelled deals. 
Deal outcome. 
 
1)  9/24/1990. 
    General Binding Corp and Velobind Inc. 
    DOJ. 
The Justice Department planned to file a civil antitrust suit to prevent completion of the deal. The 
department said the proposed deal would substantially reduce competition in the high-volume 
mechanized binding market. General Binding Corp signed a consent decree that creates an element of 
additional competition by bringing a third party to provide additional distribution and competition.  
    Completed. 
 
2)  4/12/1993 
     Chipsoft Inc. and MECA Software Inc. 
     FTC 
     Both companies decided to cancel the merger following FTC’s anticompetitve concerns.  
     Withdrawn.  
 
3)  6/10/1993 
     Columbia Hospital Corp and Galen Healthcare Inc. 
     FTC 
     Columbia Hospital Corp is required to sell its hospital in Kissimmee. 
     Completed. 
 
4)  9/7/1993 
     Dresser Industries Inc. and Baroid Corp 
     FTC 
 Under a consent decree, the combined company must shed either Dresser’s or Baroid’s drilling fluid    
 business and the domestic assets of Baroid’s DB Stratabit drill bit subsidiary. In addition, DB Stratabit 
 patents and other technology must be licensed to a new competitor. 
 Completed. 
 
5) 10/3/1993 
 Columbia Healthcare Corp and HCA- Hospital Corp of America  
 FTC 
 The consent agreement requires the merged company to divest Aiken Regional Medical Center in   
 Aiken, South Carolina.  
 Completed.  
 
6)  3/15/1994 
     Adobe Systems Inc. and Aldus Corp 
     FTC 
     The FTC agreed to permit the merger after Adobe said it would divest itself of the software to the Altsys    
     Corporation, which developed it.  
     Completed.  
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7)  4/4/1994 
     Revco D.S Inc. and Hook-SupeRx Inc. 
     FTC 
     Revco is required to divest three stores in Virginia. 
     Completed. 
 
8)  5/35/1994 
     Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp and Medical Care America 
     FTC 
     The FTC issued a ruling calling for the divestiture of Alaska Surgery by Columbia/HCA by Dec 31,   
     1995.  
     Completed.  
 
9)  8/29/1994 
      IVAX Corp and Zenith Laboratories Inc.  
      FTC 
      IVAX is restricted from acquiring any interest in a company that makes verapamil or entering an         
      arrangement to distribute the drug to another manufacturer.  
      Completed. 
 
10) 8/31/1994 
      Boston Scientific Corp and Cardiovascular Imaging Systems Inc. 
      FTC 
      Boston Scientific is required to license patents for catheters to Hewlett-Packard or another purchaser.  
      Completed. 
 
11) 9/19/1994 
      HealthSouth Corp and Relife Inc.  
      FTC 
      HealthSouth agreed to sell rehabilitation facilities in Birmingham, Alabama.  
      Completed. 
 
12) 10/5/1994 
       Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp and Healthtrust Inc.  
       FTC 
       FTC required the parties to divest seven hospitals in four states- Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Utah.  
       Completed.  
 
13) 10/13/1994 
       Microsoft Corp and intuit Inc.  
       FTC 
       According to Bill Gates, Microsoft could not face additional uncertainty in a fast-paced industry.  
       Withdrawn. 
 
14) 11/8/1994 
       Boston scientific Corp and SciMed Life System Inc.  
       FTC 
       Boston Scientific agreed to license technology that uses ultrasound arteries and diagnose   
cardiovascular disease.  
       Completed.  
 
15) 2/7/1995 
       Silicon Graphics Inc and Wavefront Technologies Inc 
       FTC 
      Silicon Graphics entered a consent decree that requires it to negotiate a porting agreement with one   
      other major UNIX (R) workstation vendor to make the Alias Animator (TM) and power Animator (TM)   
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      software products available on that vendor’s systems.   
      Completed. 
 
16) 7/17/1995  
       Kimberly-Clark Corp and Scott Paper Co 
       FTC 
       Kimberly-Clark entered into a consent decree requiring it to license the Scotties brand for facial tissue    
       and to sell up to two tissue mills by June 9, 1996. Kimberly-Clark licensed the Scotties facial tissue    
       brand name and sold its tissue mill in Fort Edward, New York to privately held Irving Tissue Inc.   
      Completed.  
 
17) 7/31/1995 
Walt Disney Co and Capital Cities/ABC Inc. 
FCC 
A New York broadcasting company that owns 10 television stations around the country said it will buy 
Disney-owned KCAL-TV for $ 385 million if regulators approve the deal. Federal regulators made 
sale of the station a requirement of the Walt Disney Co’s acquisition in February of Capital 
Cities/ABC Inc., which owned Los Angeles station KABC-TV. Federal Communications Commission 
rules prohibit ownership of two television stations in a single market.  
Completed. 
 
18) 8/29/1995 
       Time Warner and Turner Broadcasting System Inc.  
       FTC 
    Time Warner, Turner, TCI agreed to make a number of structural changes and abide by certain 
restrictions designed to break down the entry barriers created by the deal. The agreement would (1) 
require TCI to divest its interest in Time Warner to a separate company (or accept a maximum of 9.2% 
nonvoting interest in Time Warner); (2) require TCI, Turner, and Time Warner to cancel their long-
term carriage agreements; (3) reduce significantly Time Warner’s enhanced opportunities for bundling 
Time Warner and Turner programming; (4) bar Time Warner’s programming interests from 
discriminating in price against rival cable systems; (5) prohibit Time Warner’s cable interests from 
discriminating in carriage decisions against rival programmers; and (6) require Time Warner’s cable 
interests to carry a rival to CNN.    
       Completed.  
 
19) 10/19/1995 
       Johnson & Johnson and Cordis Corp.  
       FTC 
       Johnson & Johnson agreed to sell the Cordis unit that makes cranial shunts.              
       Completed. 
 
20) 10/27/1995 
       Praxair Inc and CBI Industries Inc.  
       FTC 
       Praxair agreed to divest to AGA Gas, Inc., of Independence, Ohio, four industrial gas producing   
       facilities located in Bozrah, Connecticut; Madison, Wisconsin; Irwindale, California; and Vacaville,  
       California.    
       Completed.  
 
21) 11/29/1995 
       Rite Aid and Revco Inc.  
       FTC 
       The FTC did not allow the merger under any condition.  
       Withdrawn.  
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22) 1/24/1996 
       Mattel Inc. and Hasbro Inc. 
       FTC  
       Hasbro management rejected the deal because it believed that the deal would not pass antitrust 
investigation.  
       Withdrawn.  
 
23) 2/13/1996 
       Jacor Communications and Citicasters Inc. 
       DOJ 
       Jacor agreed to sell Cincinnati radio station WKRQ-FM, one of the 19 radio stations and two television 
stations Jacor would acquire in the deal.  
        Completed. 
 
24) 3/5/1996  
      American Greetings Corporation and Gibson Greetings Inc 
      FTC 
         Gibson has rejected merger negotiations with American Greetings on the basis of overwhelming   
          antitrust problems.    
       Withdrawn. 
 
25) 7/1/1996 
       Tribune Co and Renaissance Communications.  
       FCC 
       The FCC refused to grant Tribune a permanent waiver of federal rules that bar the ownership of TV 
station and newspaper in the same market. The FCC gave the company one year to sell off either the 
TV station or the newspaper before March 22 1998.   
       Completed.  
 
26) 8/5/1996 
       American Radio Systems Corp and EZ Communications Inc.  
       DOJ 
       According to the agreement with the Justice Department, EZ must divest radio station WRFX-FM in 
Charlotte, North Carolina and American must divest radio station KSSJ-FM in Shingle Springs, 
California, which will leave the merged company at the FCC’s ownership limit of five FMs in both 
Charlotte and Sacramento.  
       Completed. 
 
27) 8/14/1996 
       General Mills and Ralcorp 
       FTC 
       General Mills agreed to a consent order that requires a new entity, New Ralcorp Holding Inc, retain 
Ralcorp’s private lable cold cereal business. The order requires General Mills to permit New Ralcorp 
to transfer to any successor party, without anthorization or approval from General Mills, the right to 
manufacture and sell cereals identical to Chex brand product. The order also bars General Mills from 
delaying production of the private label Chex rivals.  
       Completed.  
 
28) 9/4/1996 
       Staples Inc. and Office depot Inc.  
       FTC  
       The FTC did not allow the merger under any condition.  
       Withdrawn.  
 
29) 10/17/1996 
       Tenet Healthcare Corp and OrNda Health Corp.  
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       FTC 
       The consent decree signed with the FTC required divesting several assets of OrNda Health Corp.  
       Completed.  
 
30) 10/28/1996 
       Cadence Design Systems Inc and Cooper & Chyan Technology 
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to permit developers of Commercial Integrated Circuit Routing Tools 
to participate in Independent Software Interface Programs. Furthermore, the companies are prohibited 
from acquiring any interest in development or sale of Integrated Circuit Routing Tools in the U.S for 
10 years.   
       Completed.  
 
31) 11/4/1996 
       J.C Penney Co and Eckerd Corp 
       FTC  
       The FTC required the companies to divest the Rite Aid North Carolina/Charleston Retail assets and the 
Thrift Retail assets.   
       Completed.  
 
32) 12/10/1996 
       Autodesk and Softdesk  
       FTC 
       Autodesk is barred from reacquiring “IntelliCADD” or any entity that owns or controls the 
IntelliCADD technology, without prior notice to the FTC for 10 years.   
       Completed.  
 
33) 2/11/1997 
       Mediq Inc. and Universal Hospital Services Inc. 
       FTC  
       The companies jointly announced that in light of the likelihood of a protracted administrative 
proceeding before the FTC extending well beyond the Oct 31, 1997 termination date for the merger, 
the uncertainty of the outcome and the costs associated with continuing to defend against the efforts of 
the FTC to obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent the merger, they have called off the deal.  
       Withdrawn.  
 
34) 7/3/1997 
       Lockheed Martin Inc Northrop Grumman Corp  
       DOJ 
       The Justice Department sued to block the acquisition on grounds the merger could threaten soldiers 
lives and taxpayers’ wallets. 
       Withdrawn.  
 
35) 8/25/1997 
      Cardinal Health Inc and Bergen Brunswig Corp 
       FTC  
       The deal was called off after the district attorney judge issued temporary injunction against the 
combination.  
       Withdrawn.  
 
36) 8/25/1997 
       Perkin-Elmer Corp and PerSpective Biosystems Inc.  
       DOJ 
       The Justice Department approved the merger after Perkin-Elmer agreed to sell PerSpective’s DNA 
synthesis patent rights.  
       Completed.  
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37) 9/19/1997 
 CBS Corporation and American Radio Systems 
 DOJ 
 The Department of Justice required CBS to divest its Boston-area radio stations. To satisy this 
requirement, CBS agreed to its Boston-area radio stations to Entercom.  
Completed. 
 
38) 9/22/1997  
       McKesson Corp and Amerisourcebergen Corp 
       FTC 
       The deal was called off after the district attorney judge issued temporary injunction against the 
combination. 
       Withdrawn.  
 
39) 10/1/1997 
      Worldcom and MCI  
      FCC  
      The FCC conditioned the merger approval on the sale of MCI’s Internet business.   
      Completed.  
 
40) 10/27/1997 
       Intel Corporation and Digital Equipment  
       FTC 
       Digital is required to license Alph technology to advance Micro devices, developer and producer of 
high performance microprocessors, and to Samsung electronics, a developer and producer of 
semiconductors, or some other commission-approved licensee. Digital also would be required to begin 
the process of certifying IBM machines, or another commission-approved company, as an alternative 
production source for Alph chips. 
       Completed.  
 
41) 11/21/1997 
       TRW Inc and BDM International  
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest the SETA Services Operations and such additional ancillary 
assets as are necessary to ensure the continued ability of the acquirer to provide SETA Services. 
Computer Sciences Corporation (NYSE: CSC) has been selected to acquire a major scientific, 
engineering and technical assistance (SETA) contract business in support of the DoD Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization (BMDO). The contract business, previously performed by BDM, was divested 
as a condition to the Federal Trade Commission's approval of TRW's acquisition of BDM in December 
1997 
       Completed.  
 
421) 1/5/1998 
       SBC and Southern New England Telecom 
       FTC 
       SBC entered a consent decree that requires it to make several important changes regarding its internal 
operations. In a addition, SBC agreed to make a voluntary payment of $ 1.3 million to the U.S 
treasury.  
       Completed.  
 
43) 1/20/1998 
       Albertson’s and Buttery Food & Drug Store 
       FTC  
       The commission’s approval endorsed an agreement by the two companies that requires Albertson’s to 
sell 15 of its stores in Montana and Wyoming to ensure continued competition for grocery customers 
in the affected cities. Seven Buttery stores in Billings; Bozeman; Butte; Great Falls; Helena; Cody; 
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Wyo; and Gillette, Wyo will be sold to Smith’s Food and Drug Centers Inc. Smith’s also will purchase 
five Albertson’s stores in Missoula; Billings; Laramine, Wyo; and Cheyenne, Wyo. A Max Food and 
Drug Cheyenne, Wyo, operated by Albertson’s also will be sold to Smith’s. Two Buttery stores in 
Casper. Wyo will be sold to another company, Supervalu Holding Inc.  
       Completed. 
 
  
44) 2/26/1998 
       Halliburton Company and Dresser Industries Inc. 
       DOJ 
       Halliburton Company entered in an agreement with W-H Energy Services Inc. for the sale of 
Halliburton’s logging-while-drilling (LWD) and related measurement-while-drilling (MWD) business 
known as PathFinder. This sale being made to comply with the consent decree Halliburton entered into 
with the U.S Department of Justice on September 29, 1998 in order to conclude the antitrust review of 
Halliburton’s merger with Dresser Industries Inc. 
       Completed.   
 
45) 3/4/1998 
       Global Industrial Technologies Inc and AP Green Industries Inc 
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest AP Green Silica Refactories Properties.  
       Completed.  
 
46) 4/15/1998 
       Holly Corporation and Giant Industries Inc. 
       FTC  
       The companies mutually agreed to terminate their proposed merger, which had been approved by the 
stockholders of both companies in last June, 1998. The decision to terminate the merger was as a result 
of the August 31st filing of a lawsuit by Loughorn Partners pipeline, L.P. against Holly and others, 
which Holly believes to be wholly without merit, and as a result of continuing delays and uncertainties 
in negotiations with the Federal Trade Commission and the New Mexico Attorney General’s office 
concerning federal and state clearance of the merger.  
       Withdrawn. 
 
47) 5/11/1998 
       SBC and Ameritech 
       FCC & DOJ 
       The FCC adopted 30 conditions to ensure the SBC-Ameritech deal would serve the public interest. The 
new SBC must enter 30 new markets with 30 months to compete with local phone companies. The 
company is required to provide deep discounts on key pieces and their networks to rivals who want to 
lease them. On March 23, the U.S. Department of Justice terminated its investigation and cleared the 
transaction, contingent on Ameritech and SBC reaching an agreement for sale of certain overlapping 
wireless properties. 
       Completed.  
 
48) 5/11/1998 
       Consolidated Edison Inc and Orange & Rockland Utilities Inc. 
 DOJ 
       The Department of Justice announced that Consolidated Edison Inc and Orange & Rockland Utilities 
Inc have resolved antitrust concerns involving their proposed merger by selling all of Orange & 
Rockland’s electric generating plants and a plant co-owned by the companies to Southern Energy Inc.  
       Completed.  
 
49) 6/24/1998 
       AT & T and TCI 
       DOJ 
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       The companies entered an agreement that requires them to transfer the Sprint PCS stock to an 
independent trustee before the merger can be closed. The trustee will have approximately five years to 
complete the stock sale.  
       Completed.  
 
50) 6/29/1998 
       Medtronic Inc and Physio-Control International Corp 
       FTC 
       The FTC required Medtronic to delegate its voting rights held pursuant to all of its Ownership Interests 
to SurVivaLink. Medtronic is also restricted from making any related acquisitions or partnerships.   
       Completed.  
 
51) 7/13/1998 
      Medtronic Inc and Avecor Cardiovascular Inc.  
      FTC 
      The FTC required Medtronic to divest the Avecor Pump assets and to accept other contracting 
limitations.  
      Completed.  
 
52) 8/3/1998  
      Albertson’s Inc and American Stores 
      FTC 
      The FTC required the companies to divest grocery related assets.   
      Completed 
 
53)  8/61998 
       Safeway Inc. and Carr-Gottstein Foods Co 
       FTC  
       The companies announced that an Alaska court approved the February 9th consent decree negotiated 
with the Alaska Attorney General governing Safeway’s proposed acquisition of Carr-Gottstein Foods 
Co. Under the terms of the consent decree, Safeway is required, among other things, to sell seven 
Alaska stores of the combined company to an approved buyer or buyers after Safeway completes its 
acquisition of Carr-Gottstein.  
        If the FTC were overseeing the Safeway-Carr deal, it would have required Safeway to find a buyer for 
the seven stores before approving the merger. And it would have publicly named the buyer and given 
the public 60 days to comment before approving or denying the sale, said Jim Fishkin, an FTC attorney 
in Washington.     
       Completed. 
 
54)  8/6/1998 
       Service Corporation International and Equity Corporation International 
       FTC 
       The FTC accepted the agreement containing consent decree order signed by Service Corporation 
International and the FTC staff in December 1998, resolving regulatory concerns of the FTC staff with 
regard to the merger. Under the consent agreement Service Corporation International is required to 
divest sufficient funeral service and cemetery properties to Carriage Services Inc in each of 14 local 
markets.  
       Completed. 
  
55) 10/19/1998 
       Kroger Co and Fred Meyer Inc.  
       FTC 
       The FTC required Kroger to divest all Supermarkets in Utah, in which Kroger had a financial interest, 
including “City Market”.  
       Completed.  
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56) 10/7/1998 
       Clear Channel Communications Inc and Jacor Communications Inc 
       FCC 
       The FCC approved the merger after the companies agreed to sell 18 radio stations in four cities to 
preserve competition.  
        Completed. 
 
 
57) 12/1/1998 
       Exxon Corp and Mobil Corp  
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest the Exxon California refining and marketing assets to a 
single acquirer and also limited the companies’ ability to form future contracts.  
       Completed.  
 
58) 1/13/1999 
       Rohm & Haas Co and Morton International Corp 
       FTC  
       The FTC required the companies to divest all rights, titles, and interests in and to Intellectual Property 
relating in any way to the research, development, manufacture, or sale of Morton Floor Care Products.  
       Completed.  
 
59) 2/18/1999 
General Dynamics Corp and Newport News Shipbuilding 
Pentagon 
Defense Secretary William Cohen said that the proposed $2 billion deal would have meant just one 
supplier for aircraft carrier and nuclear substances. It also would have reduced competition in other 
sectors of military shipbuilding, and any cost saving to the Navy would not justify that less competiton. 
 Withdrawn. 
 
60) 2/22/1999 
       Dominion Resources and Consolidated Natural Resources 
       FTC  
       The FTC approved the merger provided that Dominion divests CNG’s Virginia Natural Gas subsidiary. 
       Completed.  
 
61) 3/8/1999 
       Allied Waste Industries Inc and Browning-Ferris Industries Inc 
       DOJ 
       Allied waste has agreed to sell to Republic services certain waste services assets, which include four 
landfill operations, eleven transfer stations and a subset of small container commercial hauling assets 
from 5 collection operations, with combined reported historical revenue of approximately $123 
million. The assets are located in Akron/Canton, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Charlotte, 
North Carolina; Oakland, California; Rockford, Illinois and Kalamazoo, Michigan.     
       Completed.  
 
62) 3/29/1999 
       Computer Associates International Inc. and Platinum Technology International Inc. 
       DOJ 
        The Department of Justice reached an agreement with Computer Associates International Inc. that 
allows the company to go forward with its purchase of Platinum Technology International Inc., 
provided that Computer Associates sells six Platinum mainframe systems management software 
products and related assets.  
       Completed.  
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63) 4/22/1999 
       AT&T and MediaOne 
       FCC  
       The FCC granted the merger conditional approval. The Federal Communication Commission required 
that AT&T comply with rules barring any company from owning more than 30 percent of the nation’s 
market for subscription-television services, including cable and satellite.    
       Completed.  
 
64) 4/28/1999 
 Libbey Inc and Oneida Ltd 
 Oneida board members said they rejected Libbey’s proposal because it includes substantial 
contingencies and uncertainties including concerns about financial and antitrust laws. 
Withdrawn. 
  
65) 5/6/1999 
Litton Industries and Newport News Shipbuilding 
FTC 
Michael R. Brown, Litton chairman, president and chief executive officer, said that it is evident that 
our proposed transaction is unlikely to receive the necessary government approval at this time. 
Although we are disappointed by this outcome, we respectfully withdraw our proposal.  
Withdrawn. 
 
66) 5/17/1999 
       Precision Castparts Corp and Wyman-Gordon Corp 
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest the Albany Facility assets.  
       Completed.  
 
67) 6/21/1999  
      Abbott Laboratories and Alza Corp 
      FTC 
      The companies abandoned their planned merger after failing to agree on terms with the Federal Trade 
Commission to satisfy its concerns relating to the merger.  
       Withdrawn.   
 
68) 7/15/1999 
      Compuware Corporation and Viasoft Inc.  
      DOJ 
      The parties have terminated the agreement due to uncertainty associated with civil action filed by the 
U.S. department of Justice on Friday 29, 1999 to enjoin Compuware’s acquisition of Viasoft, as well as 
the substantial costs associated with the litigation. Accordingly, the parties determined that it was in 
the best interest of both companies to terminate the agreement.  
       Withdrawn.   
 
69) 8/4/1999 
      Dow Chemical Company and Union Carbide Corp 
      FTC 
      The FTC required the companies to divest the Dow Global Ethyleneamines business.  
      Completed.  
 
70) 8/11/1999 
       Alcoa Inc and Reynolds Metals Co 
       DOJ 
       Alcoa sold its stake in a western Australian alumina refinery to satisfy the requirements of government 
regulators in its purchase of Reynolds Metals Inc. 
       Completed.  
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71) 9/7/1999 
      Viacom Inc. and CBS Corp  
      FCC 
      The FTC required the merged company to comply with rules barring any firm from owning stations that 
serve more than 35 percent of the nationwide television audience.   
      Completed. 
  
72)  10/4/1999. 
Clear Channel Communications Inc and AMFM Inc 
       FCC and DOJ 
        The Federal Communications Commission and the Justice Department required the companies to shed 
a total of 122 radio stations in 37 areas to satisfy antitrust concerns and federal limits on ownership 
concentration in local markets.  
       Completed.  
 
73) 10/5/1999 
       DTE Energy Corp and MCN Energy Group Inc 
       FTC  
       The FTC required the companies to divest all rights, titles, and interest acquired by DTE from MCN 
pursuant to the merger in all assets and businesses relating to the transportation, distribution, and 
storage of natural gas, and the marketing and sale of natural gas distribution services, for Electric 
Displacement Load in the overlap area.  
       Completed.  
 
74) 11/4/1999 
       Pfizer and Warner-Lambert Co 
       FTC  
       The FTC required the companies to terminate the Celexa Co- promotion agreement and Celexa 
amendment.  
       Completed.  
 
75) 1/17/2000 
       JDS Uniphase Corporation ans E-TEK Dynamics Inc.  
       DOJ 
       The companies agreed to sell supply contracts for the manufacture of thin-film filters, which the 
Department of Justice argued would be monopolized under the merged companies.  
        Completed.  
 
76) 2/29/2000 
       Telecorp PDS Inc. and Tritel Inc.  
       FCC  
       The FCC required that the companies sell part of its spectrum that overlaps in Bowling-Glasgow 
County, Ky.    
       Completed.  
 
77) 5/23/2000 
       United Airlines Corporation and US Airways 
        DOJ 
        The companies terminated the planned merger following the announcement of the Department of 
Justice that will block the deal. 
        Withdrawn. 
 
78) 6/25/2000 
 Philip Morris Companies and Nabisco Holding Corp 
 FTC 
 98
 To resolve Federal Trade Commission’s competitive misgivings about the merger, Philip Morris 
agreed to sell Nabisco’s U.S dry-packaged dessert baking powder businesses to the Jel Fert Co and its 
mints operations to Hershey Foods Corp. 
 Completed. 
 
79) 6/26/2000 
       Valspar Corp and Lilly Industries 
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest all of Valspar’s business, assets, properties, and goodwill 
tangible and intangible relating to the research, development, manufacture, quality assurance, customer 
support, marketing or sale of Mirror Coatings.   
       Completed.  
 
80) 7/10/2000 
       JDS Uniphase Corporation and SDL Inc.  
       DOJ 
       JDS Uniphase agreed to sell 980 nanometer pump laser chip business to Nortel Networks in order to 
resolve antitrust concerns about its proposed acquisition of SDL Inc. The Department of Justice said 
that the deal as originally proposed would have led to the loss of head-to-head competition in the 
production of 980 nm pump laser chips, resulting in higher prices for businesses and less product 
innovation. Under the divestiture, JDS Uniphase has agreed to sell its entire Uniphase Laser Enterprise 
division to Nortel Networks in a transaction valued at about $3 billion. 
        Completed.   
 
81) 7/17/2000 
       Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Fort James Corporation 
       DOJ 
       Georgia-Pacific agreed to sell its commercial tissue business to resolve Department of Justice 
investigation.  
       Completed. 
 
82) 9/5/2000 
       Worldcom and Intermedia 
       FCC 
       Worldcom agreed to shed all of Intermedia’s business operations except its valuable controlling stake 
on Digex Inc., a leading operator of computer centers that run Web sites.  
       Completed.  
 
83) 10/16/2000 
       Chevron Corp and Texaco Inc  
       FTC  
       The FTC required the companies to divest their Equilon interest.  
       Completed.  
 
84) 4/25/2001 
      General Dynamics Corp and Newport News Shipbuilding 
      DOJ 
      The Department of Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit to block the proposed acquisition.   
      Withdrawn. 
 
85) 5/4/2001  
       Valero Energy Corp and Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corp 
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest the Golden Eagle CARB Refining and Marketing assets.  
       Completed. 
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86) 7/31/2001  
       Zebra Technologies and Fargo Electronics 
       FTC 
       In a joint release, the companies said that based on talks with representatives of the Federal Trade 
Commission, Zebra and Fargo believe it is unlikely that the FTC will clear the transaction as currently 
proposed. Accordingly, the companies agreed to a mutual termination of their acquisition agreement 
and neither party will pay break-up fee.  
        Withdrawn.   
 
87) 10/25/2001 
       NetRatings Inc. and Jupiter Media Metrix Inc 
       FTC 
       Both companies called the mergerl off after the FTC indicated it would challenge the deal.   
       Withdrawn.  
 
88) 11/18/2001 
       Phillips Petroleum Co and Conoco Inc 
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest Phillips Woods Cross assets.  
       Completed.  
 
89) 12/17/2001 
       Amgen Inc and Immunex Corp  
       FTC  
       The FTC required the companies to divest the Leukine assets.  
       Completed.  
 
90) 2/19/2002 
      Cytec Corporation and Digene Corporation 
       FTC 
       The FTC decided to go to court to block the deal. Charles M. Fleischman, Digene’s president, chief 
financial officer and chief operating officer, said “It’s not in the best interests of the company to go 
through a potentially protracted and uncertain dispute in the courts with the FTC.   
        Withdrawn. 
 
91) 2/22/2002 
       Northrop Grumman Corporation and TRW Inc.  
       DOJ  
       To win the approval of the Department of Justice, Northrop agreed to sell satellite sensors to 
competitors at a fair price.  
        Completed. 
  
92) 4/2/2002 
       Quest Diagnostics Inc. and Unilab Inc 
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest the purchased assets to LabCorp pursuant to and in 
accordance with the LabCorp purchase agreement.  
       Completed.  
 
93) 7/15/2002 
       Pfizer Inc and Phamacia Corp 
       FTC 
       The FTC required the companies to divest the Darifenacin assets.  
       Completed.  
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